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In the recent California three strikes cases, the Supreme
Court once again rejected strong proportionality limits on the
duration of prison sentences under the Eighth Amendment
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. In Ewing v. California,
a three-Justice plurality and four dissenters appeared to agree
that the Eighth Amendment forbids prison sentences that are
"grossly disproportionate," but disagreed as to the application
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of that standard.1 The plurality expressly (and the dissenters,
implicitly) adopted the view, expressed by Justice Kennedy in
his concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan,2 that the
Eighth Amendment imposes only a "narrow" proportionality
principle in noncapital cases. The Court therefore upheld the
defendant's sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life in prison for
the offense of stealing three golf clubs. 3
In separate concurring opinions, Justices Scalia and Tho-
mas maintained that the Eighth Amendment imposes no pro-
portionality limits whatsoever. 4 Justice Scalia argued that the
concept of Eighth Amendment proportionality accepted by the
plurality and dissenters is unintelligible and inappropriate. It
is unintelligible, he maintained, because proportionality "is in-
herently a concept tied to the penological goal of retribution."5
Yet the plurality conceded that the Eighth Amendment "does
not mandate adoption of any one penological theory,"6 and thus
agreed that courts must consider whether a given sentence
might be justified by other purposes such as incapacitation and
deterrence-purposes which, in Justice Scalia's view, have
nothing to do with the concept of proportionality. Justice Scalia
further argued that, in assessing punishments in light of such a
wide range of purposes, "the plurality is not applying law but
evaluating policy," which is not a proper role for the courts. 7
None of the other Justices responded in Ewing to Scalia's cri-
tique or explained what they meant by proportionality.8 Indeed,
1. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
2. 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, Jus-
tice Stevens, dissenting in Ewing, questioned whether the Harmelin analysis
should apply to a recidivist case. 538 U.S. at 32 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. 538 U.S. at 20, 30-31.
4. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, had expressed similar views
in his plurality opinion in Harmelin. 501 U.S. at 965. However in Ewing, Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, accepting lim-
ited proportionality review. 538 U.S. at 14, 22-24.
5. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 25 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)).
7. Id. at 32. In his opinion for the Court in Harmelin, Justice Scalia had
argued that Eighth Amendment proportionality review is "an invitation to im-
position of subjective values" involving judgments best left to the legislature.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 986-89.
8. However, Justice Stevens did state that the Eighth Amendment "ex-
presses a broad and basic proportionality principle that takes into account all




no clear definition of proportionality can be found in any of the
Court's noncapital cases. 9
The companion case to Ewing, Lockyer v. Andrade,10 had
even stronger facts: a sentence of fifty-years-to-life for two
shoplifting incidents involving nine videotapes. The Court's af-
firmance of this extremely harsh punishment prompted the dis-
sent to complain that "[i]f Andrade's sentence is not grossly
disproportionate, the principle has no meaning."'" However,
Andrade provides even less guidance than Ewing does as to
Eighth Amendment standards, since the Court did not rule di-
rectly on that issue. 12
As a result of these holdings and diverse opinions, it re-
mains very unclear when the Court will find a prison sentence
unconstitutionally disproportionate, and on what precise
grounds. 13 Does the narrow approach currently favored by a
majority of the Justices preclude a finding of unconstitutional-
ity even on the more extreme facts of Andrade? How should
proportionality be defined, relative to nonretributive sentencing
purposes? And if different proportionality standards apply to
different sentencing purposes, are these standards disjunctive
or conjunctive-must they all be exceeded, or just one of them,
before a sentence will be found to violate the Eighth Amend-
ment?
9. The Court's proportionality analysis in capital cases is discussed infra
notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
10. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
11. Id. at 83 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12. The Court only indirectly considered Eighth Amendment require-
ments because of the limited scope of federal court review in habeas corpus
cases. Id. at 71. For further discussion of Andrade, see infra notes 85-88 and
accompanying text.
13. Lower courts were very unsure about Eighth Amendment limits in the
wake of the Harmelin decision. See Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-
Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's Tortured Approach To Cruel And
Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 161-62 (1995); Nancy J. King, Portion-
ing Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 110-12 (1995); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and
Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 681, 698 (1998). This uncertainty appears to have continued unabated
after Ewing. See Joshua R. Pater, Struck Out Looking: Continued Confusion in
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Review After Ewing v. California, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 413-15 (2003). Indeed, in holding that the Cali-
fornia courts did not violate "clearly established" federal law (and thus, that
they could not be overruled on federal habeas corpus, see discussion supra
note 12), the Court stated: "our precedents in this area have not been a model
of clarity .... [W]e have not established a clear or consistent path for courts to
follow." Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.
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These issues extend far beyond the scope and application of
the United States Constitution; they arise in the interpretation
of state constitutional counterparts to the Eighth Amendment
and other provisions applicable to sentencing, and in the for-
mulation and application of subconstitutional sentencing law
and policy by state and federal legislators, prosecutors, judges,
and parole boards. In all of these contexts, how should propor-
tionality values be defined and applied, particularly in relation
to nonretributive sentencing goals?
Part of the problem is semantic. Anglo-American courts
and scholars have usually (but as will be shown, not univer-
sally) applied the concept of proportionality only when discuss-
ing retributive sentencing principles. Moreover, the text of the
Eighth Amendment contains no mention of either proportional-
ity or specific penalties other than fines. But the text does ex-
pressly prohibit excessive fines as well as excessive bail, and
the majority of the Justices now on the Court clearly believe
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits ex-
cessive applications of capital punishment and imprisonment.
In seeking to give more precise meaning to the Eighth Amend-
ment and the limitations it places on retributive and nonre-
tributive sentencing purposes, we must keep in mind that the
fundamental and unifying concept is excessiveness, not "pro-
portionality" in the traditional Anglo-American sense. How-
ever, because the Supreme Court has used the latter term
when discussing Eighth Amendment limits on prison dura-
tions, and because the broader meaning of proportionality is al-
ready well established in some areas of law, the remainder of
this Article will use the term "proportionality" to refer to limi-
tations on nonretributive as well as retributive sentencing pur-
poses.
This Article identifies several concepts of proportionality
that are well established in U.S., foreign, and international
law. A better understanding of these concepts shows that pro-
portionality analysis is not limited to retributive theory. Nor is
such analysis purely a matter of legislative, executive, or judi-
cial policy. In a wide variety of contexts, the Supreme Court,
lower courts in the United States, and high courts in other
countries have recognized and applied one or more proportion-
ality concepts in the course of constitutional adjudication.
Moreover, these proportionality principles are independent and




Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the facts and opin-
ions in the six modern Supreme Court cases dealing with
Eighth Amendment proportionality limits on the duration of
prison sentences. These cases provide important legal back-
ground and factual context; however, readers who are already
very familiar with these cases may wish to proceed directly to
Part II, which is the conceptual heart of the Article. Part II
clarifies the meaning of retributive proportionality, and intro-
duces two nonretributive proportionality concepts. Specifically,
a governmental action or other measure may be disproportion-
ate in a utilitarian sense for two independent reasons: (1) be-
cause the measure's costs and burdens outweigh the likely
benefits ("ends disproportionality"); or (2) because the measure
is unnecessarily costly or burdensome when compared to alter-
native means of achieving the same benefits ("means dispropor-
tionality").
Part III of this Article shows how these three proportional-
ity concepts have been recognized in a variety of American con-
stitutional law doctrines. Part IV briefly notes the wide support
for the same three proportionality concepts in foreign and in-
ternational law. Part V examines several ways in which the
three proportionality principles could be incorporated into cur-
rent or alternative Eighth Amendment standards, and argues
that the simplest approach is the best choice. The discussion
then returns to the facts of the six cases summarized in Part I
and examines how they might be decided under this approach.
I argue that, with a better understanding of proportionality
principles, some of the cases declining to find an Eighth
Amendment violation might have been decided differently by
the Supreme Court. Moreover, most of these cases can and
should be decided differently under state constitutional coun-
terparts to the Eighth Amendment because state courts are
more politically accountable, and are not constrained by issues
of federalism. The concluding section reflects on the uncertain
past and brighter future of proportionality jurisprudence in the
United States.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF PRISON-DURATION
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE SUPREME COURT
Since 1980, the Supreme Court has decided six cases in
which the duration of a prison sentence was attacked on Eighth
[89:571576
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Amendment grounds. 14 In only one of these cases did the Court
rule in favor of the prisoner. All six cases were five-to-four deci-
sions in form or substance (the concurring Justice in Hutto v.
Davis agreed with the three dissenters, but felt bound by prece-
dent 15).
A. RUMMEL V. ESTELLE
In Rummel v. Estelle,16 the Court upheld a life sentence,
with parole eligibility after ten to twelve years, 17 under a Texas
recidivist (three strikes) statute. Rummel's criminal record con-
14. Prior to 1980 there had been no prison sentence proportionality deci-
sions in the Court for over sixty years. Weems v. United States invalidated a
multifaceted Philippine penalty as much for the unusual nature of its accesso-
ries (relative to common law traditions) as for its disproportionality. 217 U.S.
349, 365-66, 382 (1910). However, Weems did explicitly describe the belief that
the Eighth Amendment requires punishments to be "graduated and propor-
tioned to offense." Id. at 367. A few years later, two cases rejected attacks on
prison terms without mentioning Weems. Badders v. United States, 240 U.S.
391 (1916); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912). In Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958), a four-Justice plurality applied Eighth Amendment pro-
portionality limits to the penalty of divestment of citizenship, noting that "the
words of the Amendment are not precise, and ... their scope is not static. The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 100-01. Robinson v. Cali-fornia found that a California statute making it a crime to be addicted to nar-
cotics inflicted cruel and unusual punishment no matter how short the prison
or jail term. 370 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1962). However, in Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514 (1968), the Court upheld the conviction of an alcoholic for being found
intoxicated in public, rejecting arguments that the defendant could not control
his drinking and thus, in effect, was punished for being an alcoholic. Powell
suggests that the constitutional defect in Robinson was punishment of mere
"status," unaccompanied by any conduct. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Ju-
risprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 994 (1978); see also Malcolm E. Wheeler,
Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 839-42 (1972) (describing capital and non-
capital cases which have held that punishments can violate the Eighth
Amendment either in their form or in their amount, according to at least three
standards: "inhuman and barbarous" treatment, violation of the "dignity of
man," or "unnecessary" to the achievement of legitimate penal goals).
15. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) (Powell, J., con-
curring); see also infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
16. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
17. Justice Rehnquist's opinion assumed that Rummel would be eligible
for parole "in as little as 12 years." Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280. However, the
lower court believed Rummel "might serve no more than 10 years." Id. at 293(Powell, J., dissenting); see Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 659 (5th Cir.
1978); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 302 (1983) ("Rummel could have
been eligible for parole in as few as 10 years, and could have expected to be-
come eligible, in the normal course of events, in only 12 years.").
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sisted of three nonviolent property crimes. His most recent of-
fense was obtaining money (about $121) by false pretenses. His
two earlier convictions involved fraudulent use of a credit card
and passing a forged check; the total property loss for all three
crimes was $229. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion noted
that the Court's death penalty cases applying proportionality
principles "are of limited assistance" in deciding a case like
Rummel, "[b]ecause a sentence of death differs in kind from
any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long."18 He con-
cluded that "one could argue without fear of contradiction by
any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified
as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of im-
prisonment in the state penitentiary, the length of the sentence
actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 19
Justice Rehnquist also stated (quoting from an earlier death
penalty case) that Eighth Amendment decisions "should not be,
or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Jus-
tices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent."20 He concluded that any distinc-
tions between prison terms of different durations "are indeed
'subjective,' and therefore properly within the province of legis-
latures, not courts."21 Justice Powell, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented (for reasons very similar
to those Justice Powell cited in his majority opinion in Solem v.
Helm, discussed infra).22
B. HuTTo v. DAVIS
In Hutto v. Davis, the defendant received a sentence of
forty years and a $20,000 fine for possession with intent to dis-
tribute, and distribution of about nine ounces of marijuana.23
The maximum sentence on each count was forty years; the jury
had recommended twenty-year sentences, and the trial court
apparently made the two terms consecutive because of Davis's
record-he had previously been convicted of selling LSD, and
the current offenses were committed while he was on bail pend-
18. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272.
19. Id. at 274.
20. Id. at 274-75 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
21. Id. at 275-76.
22. Id. at 295 (Powell, J., concurring); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983);
see also infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
23. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371 (1982) (per curiam).
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ing appeal from the previous conviction.2 4 In a per curiam opin-
ion, the Court affirmed Davis's sentence, relying on Rummel.2 5
Justice Powell objected to the sentence, but felt bound by Rum-
mel. 26 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. 27
C. SOLEM v. HELM
Solem v. Helm,28 decided one year after Hutto, is the only
case in which the Court has found that a lengthy prison term
violated the Eighth Amendment. Helm received a sentence of
life without possibility of parole under a South Dakota "four
strikes" recidivist statute. Helm actually had six prior felony
convictions-three for third-degree burglary, and one each for
obtaining money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and fel-
ony (third offense) drunk driving. His seventh and most recent
felony offense was issuing a no-account check for $100.29
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Solem traced the his-
tory of proportionality rules, beginning with Magna Carta pro-
visions requiring fines to be graded according to offense seri-
ousness. Powell concluded that the proportionality principle is
well established in Anglo-American law and in the Court's prior
cases. 30 Nor, he maintained, does the history or language or the
Eighth Amendment suggest any distinction between types of
punishments-all of the Amendment's clauses (bail, fines, cruel
and unusual punishments) forbid excessiveness, and "[i]t would
be anomalous indeed" if fines and the death penalty were sub-ject to proportionality analysis, but the "intermediate punish-
ment of imprisonment" was not.3 1 Powell did concede that
death penalty cases are of limited value in assessing prison
sentences, that reversals of such sentences on proportionality
grounds will be "exceedingly rare,"32 that reviewing courts
should grant substantial deference to legislative judgments,
and that proportionality review "should be guided by objective
24. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1233 (4th Cir. 1978), overruled by
Hutto, 454 U.S. at 372. There was no indication in any of the Supreme Court
or lower court opinions as to when Davis would have become eligible for pa-
role.
25. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374-75.
26. Id. at 375-81 (Powell, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 381-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
29. Id. at 279-83.
30. Id. at 284-88.
31. Id. at 289.
32. Id. at 289-90 (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
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factors."33 Powell found three such factors in the Court's prior
cases:
First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty....
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more serious crimes are
subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some
indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive....
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.3 4
As to the first factor, Powell argued that courts are compe-
tent to objectively assess degrees both of offense gravity and of
punishment severity, and that courts are required, in a variety
of contexts, to draw similar lines along a continuum. 35 He sug-
gested that offense gravity should be assessed in terms of the
harm caused or threatened to victims and society, and the of-
fender's culpability, including the defendant's degree of intent
(mens rea) and motives. 36
Applying these criteria, Powell noted first that Helm's con-
viction and prior offenses were all minor and nonviolent, and
that his sentence was the most severe authorized by South Da-
kota at the time.3 7 Powell conceded that states are justified in
punishing recidivists more severely, but added in a footnote:
"We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers
the life sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for
each of his prior offenses."38 In another note, Powell argued
that Helm's life-without-parole sentence "is unlikely to advance
the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial
way."39 As for the second factor listed above, Powell argued that
Helm had been treated as or more severely than many South
Dakota criminals "who have committed far more serious
crimes." 40 Under the third factor, Powell concluded that "Helm
33. Id. at 290-91.
34. Id. at 290-92. Similar factors had also been recognized by several
lower courts. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140-42 (4th Cir. 1973); People
v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 831-33 (Mich. 1972).
35. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-95.
36. Id. at 293-94.
37. Id. at 296-97.
38. Id. at 296 n.21.
39. Id. at 297 n.22.
40. Id. at 299.
[89:571580
PROPORTIONALITY
was treated more severely than he would have been in any
other state."41
Chief Justice Burger dissented, joined by Justices White,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor.42 The dissenters noted that four of
Helm's prior crimes (three burglaries and one drunk driving
violation) carried a potential for violence; that the defendant in
Rummel had fewer prior convictions than Helm, all of them
truly nonviolent; and that proportionality review had never be-
fore been used to invalidate a prison sentence solely because of
its duration.4 3
None of the opinions in Solem provides a clear definition of
proportionality in either a capital or noncapital sentencing con-
text.
D. HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court upheld a mandatory
sentence of life without parole that was imposed on a first-time
offender convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of co-
caine. 44 Harmelin contested both the severity of the sentence
and its mandatory nature. Five Justices voted to uphold the
sentence in two opinions written by Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy. Most of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court was joined
only by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Scalia argued that
Solem was wrongly decided-that the Eighth Amendment con-
tains no proportionality guarantee, and that proportionality re-
view is inherently subjective, is too narrowly tied to retributive
punishment theory, involves judgments best left to the legisla-
ture, and is inconsistent with federalism a5 Part IV of Justice
Scalia's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, concluded that mandatory
penalties, even severe ones, "may be cruel, but they are not un-
usual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in
41. Id. at 300.
42. Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
43. Chief Justice Burger distinguished Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910), as involving a bizarre penalty, unknown to the common law.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 306-07.
44. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991). This penalty was
later struck down under the Michigan Constitution, see People v. Bullock, 485
N.W.2d 866, 877-78 (Mich. 1992), in part because the state constitution for-
bids cruel or (not and) unusual punishments. Id. at 872; cf. People v. Fluker,
498 N.W.2d 431, 431-32 (Mich. 1993) (noting that Bullock applies only to pos-
session, not drug delivery offenses).
45. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961-94.
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various forms throughout our Nation's history."46 Justice Scalia
distinguished the Court's cases requiring an individualized de-
termination that capital punishment is appropriate, because
"death is different."47
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter, concluded that the Court's prior Eighth
Amendment cases recognize a "narrow" proportionality princi-
ple,48 based on five underlying assumptions: (1) fixing prison
terms for specific crimes requires fundamental choices about
sentencing purposes which are primarily for the legislature, not
the courts;49 (2) the Eighth Amendment "does not mandate...
any one penological theory";50 (3) "marked divergences" both in
penal theories and in prison terms "are the inevitable, often
beneficial, result of the federal structure";51 (4) proportionality
review should, as much as possible, be informed by "objective
factors," the "most prominent" of which is "the objective line be-
tween capital punishment and imprisonment for a term of
years" (because courts "lack clear objective standards to distin-
guish between sentences for different terms of years");52 and
therefore (5) "[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, [the
Amendment] forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime."5 3
Justice Kennedy also announced a modified version of the
three-factor Solem test: intra- and inter-jurisdictional compara-
tive assessments (Solem factors two and three) "are appropriate
only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the
crime committed and the sentence imposed [(Solem factor one)]
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."54 Kennedy
concluded that the latter standard was not met in Harmelin's
case.55 His crime was much more serious than Solem's $100 bad
check. The 672 grams, or more than 1.5 pounds, of cocaine
Harmelin possessed might produce as many as 65,000 doses,
46. Id. at 994-95.
47. Id. at 994 (reaffirming the same claim made in Rommel).
48. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 998.
50. Id. at 999.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1000-01 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 1001 (citation omitted).




threatening "grave harm to society" in terms of the effects on
users, crimes committed by users, and violent crimes commit-
ted "as part of the drug business or culture."56 Therefore,
Michigan legislators "could with reason conclude" that Har-
melin's crime "is momentous enough to warrant the deterrence
and retribution of a life sentence without parole." 57
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dis-
sented. Justice White's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens, argued that proportionality principles have long
historical roots and have been read into all of the clauses of the
Eighth Amendment; that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause makes no distinction among types of punishments; that
the Solem factors have worked well; that the second and third
factors are actually more objective than the first, and strongly
support a finding of disproportionality in Harmelin's case; and
that Justice Kennedy's application of the first Solem factor is
both too subjective and too narrow, focusing mainly on the
harm threatened by this amount of drugs and not enough on
critical culpability issues such as intent and motive. 58 Justice
White also noted that Harmelin was never charged with or
convicted of distribution, or even intent to distribute.59
Once again, none of the opinions in Harmelin provided a
definition of proportionality. Justice Scalia seemed to think this
concept is inherently tied to retributive sentencing goals, and
that "it becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of 'propor-
tionality' once deterrence and rehabilitation are given signifi-
cant weight." 60 Justice Kennedy stated that all traditional pun-
ishment purposes are valid, including retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, since "the Eighth Amend-
ment does not mandate any one penological theory."6' 1 One
56. Id. at 1002.
57. Id. at 1003.
58. Id. at 1009-27 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's separate dis-
sent agreed with Justice White except as to some of the latter's statements
about the death penalty. Id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
also wrote a dissent, objecting that mandatory sentences of death or life with-
out parole conclusively presume the defendant is incorrigible so that society's
interests in deterrence and retribution outweigh any considerations of reha-
bilitation; that such a presumption is irrational; and that Harmelin's sentence
was as capricious, and therefore as cruel and unusual, as being struck by
lightning. Id. at 1028-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1021-23.
60. Id. at 989.
61. Id. at 999.
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reading of Kennedy's opinion would be that the Eighth
Amendment is only violated if a sentence is "disproportionate"
relative to all of the state's asserted punishment purposes. But,
Justice Scalia would ask: what does it mean to say that a sen-
tence is "disproportionate"--or even "excessive"-relative to
nonretributive goals such as deterrence, incapacitation, and re-
habilitation? This question will be addressed in Part II, infra.
E. EWING V. CALIFORNIA
The Court's two most recent prison duration cases impli-
cating the Eighth Amendment involved lengthy sentences im-
posed under California's unusually severe three strikes law. 62
In the first case, Ewing v. California, the Court upheld a sen-
tence of twenty-five-years-to-life for the theft of three golf clubs
worth $399 each. 63 Ewing had incurred more than a dozen prior
convictions in the previous twenty years for theft, burglary,
robbery, battery, possessing a firearm, and possessing drug
paraphernalia. 64 As in Harmelin, five Justices voted to uphold
the sentence. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, adopted the nar-
row proportionality principle articulated in Justice Kennedy's
Harmelin concurrence-including each of Justice Kennedy's
five underlying principles, as well as his further proviso that
the second and third Solem factors need only be considered in
rare cases where the first factor raises a "threshold" inference
of gross disproportionality. 65
Applying Justice Kennedy's approach, Justice O'Connor
concluded that Ewing's sentence was not grossly disproportion-
ate. Justice O'Connor noted that the purposes of the three
strikes law are to deter repeat offenders and incapacitate those
who have not been deterred, and she cited evidence suggesting
that both goals had been furthered by the law.66 In assessing
the gravity of Ewing's conviction offense-stealing three golf
62. Offenders convicted of any felony, with two or more prior convictions
for "serious" or "violent" crimes, receive a life sentence with parole eligibility
after twenty-five years (or longer, in some cases). CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999), 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West 2004). Lesser, albeit still
very severe, "two strikes" sentences apply to offenders with only one such prior
conviction. Id. §§ 667(e)(1), 1170.12(c)(1).
63. 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30-31 (2003).
64. Id. at 18-19.
65. See id. at 23-24, 30.
66. Id. at 24-28, 30. For a critique of Justice O'Connor's evidence, see in-
fra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
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clubs-Justice O'Connor argued that this was more serious
than Helm's crime, and that it was constitutionally irrelevant
that Ewing's theft offense could, under the trial court's discre-
tion, be treated as a misdemeanor rather than a felony (such
crimes are known as "wobblers" in California). 67 Justice
O'Connor further argued that, to accord proper deference to the
State's choice of punishment goals, the gravity of Ewing's "of-
fense" should include his extensive prior record, not just his
conviction offense. 68
Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring in separate opin-
ions, each argued that Solem's proportionality test is unwork-
able, and that no such requirement should be recognized under
the Eighth Amendment. 69 Justice Scalia essentially repeated
points from his Harmelin opinion-that the Eighth Amend-
ment was only aimed at excluding certain modes of punish-
ment; that the proportionality concept is inherently tied to re-
tributive goals; that since the Court does not require states to
adopt retribution or any other penological theory (and specifi-
cally approves California's adoption of deterrence and incapaci-
tation), the concept of proportionality cannot be intelligently
applied; and that if proportionality review means that "all pun-
ishment should reasonably pursue the multiple purposes of the
criminal law," then the Court would not be "applying law but
evaluating policy." 70
Justices Stevens and Breyer wrote dissenting opinions,
each joined by the other and by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
Justice Stevens argued that the Eighth Amendment sets pro-
portionality limits for all forms of punishment. 71 He noted that
such limits have also been applied to bail and to punitive dam-
ages awards (see discussion, infra Part III); that sentencing
judges have long employed proportionality principles to guide
their discretion; and that the Eighth Amendment "expresses a
broad and basic proportionality principle that takes into ac-
count all of the justifications for penal sanctions."72 Justice Ste-
vens also questioned whether the Harmelin framework should
67. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28-29.
68. Id. at 29-30.
69. Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 33-35.
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govern Ewing's case, noting that the three-factor Solem test
"specifically addressed recidivist sentencing."73
Justice Breyer assumed for purposes of his dissent that
Justice Kennedy's Harmelin framework applied, 74 and further
appeared to accept Justice O'Connor's view that prior record is
relevant to the "gravity of the offense." However, Justice Breyer
maintained that the focus ought to be on the conviction of-
fense. 75 He also noted the absence of evidence that shoplifting
is difficult to deter or that lengthy prison terms are necessary
to deter this crime. 76 Taking all of this into account-Ewing's
sentence, 77 his conviction offense, and his prior record--Justice
Breyer concluded that Ewing's case was more similar to Helm's
than to Rummel's, and that a "threshold" inference of gross
disproportionality had been raised.78
Justice Breyer then turned to intra- and inter-
jurisidictional comparisons (noting, as Justice White had, dis-
senting in Harmelin, that such comparisons make proportional-
ity review more objective). 79 He concluded that these compari-
sons validated his threshold determination: "Outside the
California's three strikes context, Ewing's recidivist sentence is
virtually unique in its harshness for his offense of conviction,
and by a considerable degree. .. ,"80 "[It is,] at a minimum, 2 to
3 times the length of sentences that other jurisdictions would
impose in similar circumstances." 8 1 Nor could Justice Breyer
find any important practical administrative justifications for
the California statute, which might justify such harsh results.
Finally, Justice Breyer questioned the need for the statute to
sweep so broadly-the goal of the legislature is to deter and in-
capacitate felons who commit "serious" and "violent" crimes, in-
73. Id.at33n.1.
74. Id. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 41 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 n.21 (1983) and
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 402-03 (1995)) (suggesting that recidi-
vists are punished only for the conviction offense, which is deemed to be ag-
gravated by prior convictions).
76. Id. at 40.
77. In weighing the severity of Ewing's twenty-five-year minimum sen-
tence, Justice Breyer noted that the defendant was thirty-eight years old, seri-
ously ill, and "will likely die in prison." Id. at 39.
78. Id. at 37-40. Justice Breyer also argued that there is no point in hav-
ing a "threshold" test unless it is easier to meet than the ultimate test. Id. at
42.
79. Id. at 42-47.
80. Id. at 47.
81. Id. at 52.
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cluding many violent and drug crimes, but excluding all prop-
erty crimes, no matter how high the loss.8 2 But as illustrated by
Ewing's case, the statute provided that any felony, including
many property crimes that would not constitute first or second
strikes, could qualify as a third strike.83 Thus, Justice Breyer
concluded, "Ewing's 25-year term amounts to overkill."84
F. LOCKYER V. ANDRADE
In a companion case to Ewing, Lockyer v. Andrade, the
Court held that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in
granting federal habeas corpus relief and overturning a Cali-
fornia three strikes sentence. 85 On its facts, Andrade presented
a much stronger basis for a finding of Eighth Amendment dis-
proportionality. Andrade's fifty-year minimum sentence was
twice as long as Ewing's, and his conviction offenses-
shoplifting nine videotapes worth about $150 from two stores-
were less serious. 86 These two counts of misdemeanor theft
were charged as felonies because of Andrade's prior property
crimes.8 7 Andrade's prior record was also less serious. Unlike
Ewing, Andrade had no prior violent or weapons convictions,
and his current and prior property offenses were all driven by
his need to buy heroin to feed his addiction.8 8
However, the Eighth Amendment holding in Andrade was
blurred by its procedural context. Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court
may only grant habeas relief if the state court's decision is "con-
trary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly es-
tablished Federal law" as determined by the Supreme Court.8 9
Thus, as explicitly noted in Justice O'Connor's majority opin-
ion, the Court's decision upholding Andrade's sentence was not
a ruling that his sentence complied with the Eighth Amend-
ment.90 The Court held only that habeas relief should not have
been granted because the state appellate court's decision af-
82. Id. at 51.
83. See CAL. PENAL CODE. §§ 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1998), 1170.12(c)(2)(A)
(West 2004).
84. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 52.
85. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 67-70 (2003).
86. See id. at 66, 68.
87. Id. at 66-68.
88. Id. at 67.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
90. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 71.
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firming Andrade's sentence was not so erroneous as to meet the
AEDPA review standard of unreasonableness. 91
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ste-
vens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the state court's deci-
sion was not only erroneous but sufficiently unreasonable to
justify habeas relief.92 Justice Souter maintained that the lower
court clearly erred in relying on Rummel rather than Solem,
since Harmelin did not overrule Solem and, in Justice Souter's
view, Andrade's case was indistinguishable from the facts of
Solem, particularly if one views a fifty-year minimum sentence
for a thirty-seven-year-old offender as equivalent to life without
parole.93 Justice Souter also found the state court decision un-
reasonable for a second reason: Andrade's sentence was irra-
tional, even when measured against the State's asserted pur-
poses. Citing the State's own briefs, Justice Souter maintained
that the only serious justification for the three strikes law was
incapacitation; furthermore, he argued, the statute represents
a legislative finding that the danger posed by a three strikes of-
fender requires a minimum sentence of twenty-five years.94
Andrade received two consecutive twenty-five-year-to-life
terms. In Justice Souter's view, it is irrational to assume that
the defendant could "somehow become twice as dangerous to
society when he stole the second handful of videotapes." 95
These opinions, from Rummel to Andrade, form the basis of
the Court's seemingly fractured jurisprudence in this area and
set the stage for Part II's discussion of the implicit theoretical
underpinnings of the Court's reasoning.
II. PROPORTIONALITY-RELATIVE TO WHAT?
The Supreme Court has never made clear what it means by
proportionality in the context of prison sentences. Justice
Scalia believes-and perhaps so does Justice Thomas-that
this concept only has meaning in relation to retributive sen-
tencing goals and that a proportionality requirement makes no
sense if the Court is not going to require states to adopt a re-
tributive theory.96 The majority of the Justices agree that the
91. See id. at 73-77.
92. Id. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 78-79.
94. Id. at 79-83.
95. Id. at 82.
96. See supra notes 5-7, 45, 70 and accompanying text.
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states are permitted to pursue nonretributive sentencing goals,
and they also appear to believe that proportionality limits can
be applied to such goals.97 But the precise meaning of propor-
tionality relative to nonretributive goals has not been dis-
cussed. Several scholars have agreed with Justice Scalia's as-
sertion that proportionality only applies under a retributive
theory of punishment. 98 Other scholars have recognized one or
more nonretributive proportionality concepts which have been
or could be recognized under the Eighth Amendment, 99 but
have not offered a complete normative and descriptive account
of these limiting principles.
This section of the Article seeks to provide such an account
and to resolve Justice Scalia's theoretical conundrum. I begin
97. See supra notes 6, 48, 66-68 and accompanying text.
98. King, supra note 13, at 192 (stating that "proportionality [of a forfei-
ture] can only be measured in relationship to the owner's culpability");
Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 62 (2000) (noting that
utilitarian theorists such as Jeremy Bentham recognize a proportionality
principle, but seemingly agreeing with Justice Scalia that "true" proportional-
ity is incompatible with utilitarian theory); Allyn G. Heald, Comment, United
States v. Gonzalez: In Search of a Meaningful Proportionality Principle, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 455, 455 n.2 (1992) (observing that the "proportionality princi-
ple is inherently a retributive concept").
99. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:
THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 190 (2001) (defining "func-
tional or instrumental excessiveness" as punishment severity that "is more
than is required" for crime-control purposes; and noting that another instru-
mental excessiveness argument is that "incremental [incapacitation] benefits
are too small to matter"); Grossman, supra note 13, at 168 n.386 (asserting
that penalties should be limited not only by retributive values but also by
utilitarian principle of parsimony, which requires the use of the least restric-
tive or punitive alternative); Radin, supra note 14, at 1047-48 (stating that
the Eighth Amendment recognizes both retributive and utilitarian limits);
Richard G. Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Bur-
den of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to
Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 51, 55, 72-89 (1972) (arguing
that the imposition of a prison sentence violates due process unless the state
proves that no less severe sanction would serve relevant sentencing purposes);
Wheeler, supra note 14, at 847-73 (discussing and applying Jeremy Ben-
tham's utilitarian proportionality principles); Margaret R. Gibbs, Note, Eighth
Amendment-Narrow Proportionality Requirement Preserves Deference to Leg-
islative Judgment, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955, 976 (1992) (seeming to
recognize the utilitarian "means" proportionality concept discussed infra: pun-
ishments should be held invalid if "significantly less severe punishments could
serve the same goal"); Bruce W. Gilchrist, Note, Disproportionality in Sen-
tences of Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1121-24 (1979) (assuming
that proportionality is inherently a retributive concept, but noting that Su-
preme Court death penalty cases recognize the utilitarian concept of "neces-
sity" as a further limiting principle).
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by clarifying what is meant by retributive proportionality, not-
ing two very different versions of retributive theory, only one of
which is appropriate for Eighth Amendment analysis. I then
discuss nonretributive sentencing theories and identify two in-
dependent proportionality concepts that apply to such theories.
A. RETRIBUTIVE PROPORTIONALITY
Although the Court has mentioned retributive sentencing
goals in numerous Eighth Amendment cases, especially those
involving capital punishment, it has never discussed this topic
in detail, and has rarely made any reference to the voluminous
literature on retributive punishment theory. Several essential
points from that literature 0 0 are relevant here.
First, retributive, or "just deserts," theory considers only
the defendant's past actions, not his or her probable future
conduct or the effects that the punishment might have on crime
rates or otherwise. Second, retribution examines the actor's de-
gree of blameworthiness for his or her past actions, focusing on
the offense being sentenced. Some retributive scholars believe
that the current offense is the only relevant consideration and
that any prior convictions are irrelevant; other scholars accept
that prior crimes modestly increase an offender's blameworthi-
ness. 101 Third, the degree of blameworthiness of an offense is
generally assessed according to two kinds of elements: the na-
ture and seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the
crime; and the offender's degree of culpability in committing
the crime, in particular, his or her degree of intent (mens rea),
motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or other dimin-
ished capacity.
Finally, there are two very different theories about the role
that retributive values should play in sentencing. These two
approaches have sometimes been referred to as "defining" and
"limiting" retributivism.10 2 According to the first theory, princi-
ples of just deserts should define the degree of punishment se-
100. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16-18
(3d ed. 2001); JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY
OF RESPONSIBILITY (1970); MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1997); PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY,
JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1995); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993).
101. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 284 and accompany-
ing text.




verity as precisely as possible; offenders should receive their
just deserts, no more and no less. This theory, as elaborated by
writers such as Andrew von Hirsch, permits crime control,
budgetary, or other nonretributive values to affect both the
overall scale of punishment severity (absolute amounts, as de-
termined by the most and least severe penalties) and the choice
among penalties deemed to be equal in severity, but it insists
on fairly strict "ordinal" proportionality in the relative severity
of penalties imposed on different offenders.103 Since defining re-
tributivism leaves little room for the operation of nonretribu-
tive values and goals, it is clearly too narrow an approach for
Eighth Amendment purposes-the Court has made it very clear
that states are free to pursue a variety of sentencing goals.
The other theory, limiting retributivism, allows all tradi-
tional punishment purposes to play a role but places retributive
outer limits both on who may be punished (only those who are
blameworthy), and how hard they may be punished (within a
range of penalties which would be widely viewed as neither un-
fairly severe or unduly lenient). This theory, most often associ-
ated with the writings of Norval Morris, 104 places particular
emphasis on avoiding unfairly severe penalties. 105 As revealed
103. See generally VON HIRSCH, supra note 100, at 45.
104. Morris's theory is described and critiqued in Richard S. Frase, Limit-
ing Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 83 (Michael Tonry ed.,
2004) [hereinafter Frase, Limiting Retributivism]. See also Richard S. Frase,
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST.: REV. RES.
363 (1997) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing Principles] (comparing Morris's the-
ory to the hybrid approach that has evolved under the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines); Grossman, supra note 13, at 168-72 (arguing that Eighth
Amendment proportionality should be construed in accordance with Morris's
theory); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punish-
ment, 91 VA L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment
should recognize retributivism as a "side constraint" on punishment severity).
The American Law Institute has recently adopted Morris's limiting retributive
theory as the theoretical framework for the revised Model Penal Code sentenc-
ing provisions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a) (Preliminary Draft No. 3,
2004); id. cmt. at 8.
105. K.G. Armstrong writes:
Justice gives ... the right to punish offenders up to some limit, but
one is not necessarily and invariably obliged to punish to the limit ofjustice .... For a variety of reasons (amongst them the hope of reform-
ing the criminal) the appropriate authority may choose to punish a
man less than it is entitled to, but it is never just to punish a man
more than he deserves.
K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PUNISHMENT 138, 155 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969); see also H.L.A. HART, Postscript:
Responsibility and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 210, 236-37 (1968) ("[M]any self-styled retributiv-
20051
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
in the cases discussed in Part III, limiting retributivism ap-
pears to be the approach that the Supreme Court has applied
when it has invoked retributive principles. This approach, em-
phasizing limits on excessive measures, is consistent with both
the text of the Eighth Amendment and the role of constitu-
tional guarantees-as protectors of human rights and bulwarks
against unfairness and abuse of governmental power.
B. NONRETRIBUTIVE PROPORTIONALITY
Nonretributive, or utilitarian, purposes of punishment fo-
cus on the future-what effect will the proposed sentence have
on the offender, on other would-be offenders, and/or on society,
and at what cost?10 6 The traditional nonretributive purposes
include deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation of an in-
dividual offender, because he is thought likely to commit fur-
ther crimes, and general deterrence of other would-be violators
both through fear of receiving similar punishment and by the
educative or norm-reinforcing effects that penalties have on
views about the relative harmfulness and wrongfulness of dif-
ferent crimes. 10 7
What does it mean to say that a sentence is disproportion-
ate, or excessive, relative to these nonretributive goals? As dis-
cussed below, utilitarian philosophy, as well as many legal
rules in the United States and abroad, suggests two kinds of
disproportionality of a governmental action or other measure.
First, a measure may be disproportionate to the ends being
pursued ("ends disproportionality"), when the measure's costs
and burdens, or added costs and burdens, outweigh the likely
benefits, or added benefits. Second, a measure may be dispro-
portionate when compared to other, less costly or burdensome
means of achieving the same goals ("means disproportional-
ity").108 Thus, under these two independent criteria, measures
ists treat appropriateness to the crime as setting a maximum within which
penalties [are chosen on crime-control grounds]."). See generally Frase, Limit-
ing Retributivism, supra note 104, at 92-94 (citing numerous authors and
model codes that emphasize strict desert limits on maximum sanction sever-
ity, with looser requirements of minimum severity).
106. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 100, at 14-15.
107. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1282, 1286-88 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2001).
108. There are several other constitutional limits on "excessive" measures
which do not raise issues of proportionality in any of the senses described in
the text. A measure (e.g., torture) can be deemed excessive and unacceptable
for any crime-regardless of just deserts, crime-control benefits, and lack of
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are disproportionate if their costs or burdens outweigh their
likely benefits or if they are unnecessarily costly or burdensome
when compared to effective alternative measures.
1. Ends Proportionality
Ends proportionality reflects basic utilitarian, cost-benefit
principles. The eighteenth century philosopher Cesare Beccaria
argued in favor of penalties proportional to the seriousness of
the offense, as measured by the harm done to society. 109 In the
early nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham made several spe-
cific utilitarian arguments in favor of punishments proportional
to the seriousness of the offense. From the point of view of pub-
lic resource allocation, "the greater an offence is, the greater
reason there is to hazard a severe punishment for the chance of
preventing it."110 Similarly, from the point of view of the suffer-
ing imposed on the offender, Bentham argued that "the evil of
the punishment [should not exceed] the evil of the offence." '111
Bentham also noted the marginal deterrent value of making
penalties proportionate to offense severity: offenders should
"have a motive to stop at the lesser" crime.11 2
As will be shown in Parts III and IV below, the utilitarian
ends proportionality principle described above is defined and
applied differently in varying legal contexts. For present pur-
effective alternative means-if it violates certain absolute values such as the
requirement of humane treatment. See ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 99, at 189;
Radin, supra note 14, at 992-93; Dirk van Zyl Smit & Andrew Ashworth, Dis-
proportionate Sentences as Human Rights Violations, 67 MOD. L. REV. 541,
544 (2004). A measure might also be considered excessive if it has no demon-
strable value whatsoever. See infra notes 133-34, 251-52 and accompanying
text (discussing the "rational basis" test as a component of U.S. death penalty
and European proportionality standards).
109. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 62-66 (Henry
Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1963) (1764).
110. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 326 (C.K. Ogden ed.,
Richard Hildreth trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1931) (1864)
(emphasis omitted).
111. Id. at 323; see also H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of
Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 104, at 158, 173 n.20.
112. BENTHAM, supra note 110, at 326 (emphasis omitted); see also
BECCARIA, supra note 109, at 63 ("If an equal punishment be ordained for two
crimes that do not equally injure society, men will not be any more deterred
from committing the greater crime, if they find a greater advantage associated
with it."); ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE
SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 41-43 (1999) (discussing the




poses, one of the most important distinctions has to do with
which kinds of costs and burdens of a government measure are
weighed against the expected benefits. In most contexts, the
public costs of a measure are very important elements in the
proportionality balance. Including publicly- as well as pri-
vately-borne costs and burdens, measures should not cost more
than the benefits they are expected to produce. But when defin-
ing a defendant's constitutional right not to be subjected to an
excessive sentence, the crime-control benefits of the sentence
should probably be weighed only against the burdens which the
sentence imposes on the defendant. It is fundamentally unfair
to impose such burdens if they greatly outweigh the expected
public benefits. As a matter of sound public policy it is also un-
wise-but probably not fundamentally unfair to the defen-
dant-to impose a sentence that costs taxpayers more than the
expected benefits are worth. Of course, in all forms of ends pro-
portionality balancing there is often a need to compare funda-
mentally incommensurate quantities, such as the burden on
the defendant of lengthy imprisonment, or the public costs of
such sentences, versus sometimes intangible crime-control
benefits. But as shown below, these difficulties have not pre-
vented the Supreme Court, lower courts, and foreign courts
from employing many ends proportionality principles which re-
quire rough balancing of qualitatively different costs and bene-
fits such as the costs and benefits of forced medication of in-
mates or of additional procedural safeguards.
The sentencing-rights ends proportionality principle has
important elements in common with retributive proportional-
ity-in particular, both principles require proportionality rela-
tive to offense severity and measure the latter from the defen-
dant's, not a public, perspective. But the two theories operate
quite differently. First, retributive theory considers the harm
caused or threatened by the defendant's past crimes, and con-
siders it just to punish in proportion to that harm. Utilitarian
theory also argues for punishment in proportion to past harm,
but only when this will prevent future similar crimes by this
offender, through deterrence, incapacitation, and/or rehabilita-
tion, or prevent such crimes by others, through general deter-
rence and norm reinforcement. Moreover, utilitarian theory
might consider not only the harm associated with a particular
act similar to the defendant's, but also the aggregate harm
caused by all such actions and the difficulty of detecting and
594 [89:571
PROPORTIONALITY
deterring such actions. 113 Second, retributive theory punishes
in direct proportion not just to the actual or threatened harms
associated with the offender's prior crime(s) but also to his cul-
pability (intent, motive, role in the offense, diminished capac-
ity, etc.). For utilitarians, such culpability factors are only rele-
vant to the extent that they are related to the likely future
benefits of punishment (e.g., the dangerousness and deterrabil-
ity of this offender or others). Finally, retributive theory disre-
gards not only crime-control benefits but also the collateral
consequences of imposing punishment because proportionate
sanctions are deemed inherently valuable in themselves. Utili-
tarian theory considers not only the actual crime-control or
other benefits produced by sanctions but also, as an offset
against those benefits, any undesirable collateral consequences
of the sanction.114 One such consequence would be "reverse de-
terrence" (for instance, if a severe three strikes law encourages
felons to kill arresting officers or potential witnesses). Other
undesirable consequences of penalties that are grossly or fre-
quently disproportionate to the conviction offense would be an
undermining of the public's sense of the relative gravity of dif-
ferent crimes and public loss of respect for, and willingness to
obey and cooperate with, criminal justice authorities.115
2. Means Proportionality
This principle recognizes basic utilitarian efficiency values:
among equally effective means to achieve a given end, those
that are less costly or burdensome should be preferred. In the
punishment context, Norval Morris calls this the principle of
parsimony.11 6 Jeremy Bentham argued that "punishment itself
is an evil and should be used as sparingly as possible"; a meas-
ure should not be used if "the same end may be obtained by
means more mild." 117 Even earlier, Cesare Beccaria argued that
punishment must not only be proportionate to the crime but
113. Wheeler, supra note 14, at 851-52.
114. Radin, supra note 14, at 1055-56.
115. H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra
note 104, at 1, 25 ("[If] the relative severity of penalties diverges sharply from
this rough scale [of proportionality], there is a risk of either confusing common
morality or flouting it and bringing the law into contempt."). See generally
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
453 (1997).
116. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59-60, 75, 78 (1974).
117. BENTHAM, supra note 110, at 323; see id. at 322-24.
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also "necessary, the least possible in the circumstances."'"18
Numerous modern authors and model code drafters have en-
dorsed this principle in some form, 119 and unnecessarily-
excessive-means arguments can be found in numerous Su-
preme Court opinions, including some involving lengthy prison
terms.120 As with the ends proportionality principle, means
proportionality is defined and applied differently in varying le-
gal contexts. In defining constitutional protections against ex-
cessively severe sentences, comparisons of the relative burdens
of proposed and alternative sentences should probably be
viewed only from the defendant's perspective-he may com-
plain that an alternative penalty would be just as effective and
much less burdensome to him, but not that such an option
would be much less costly to taxpayers. It should also be noted
that the means proportionality principle can be applied strictly
(requiring the government to chose the least burdensome alter-
native), or more loosely-requiring, for example, that the gov-
ernment need only choose another alternative if it is "signifi-
cantly less burdensome."'
12 1
118. BECCARIA, supra note 109, at 99.
119. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 116, at 59-62; ZIMRING ET AL., supra
note 99, at 190; Radin, supra note 14, at 1043-56; Singer, supra note 99, at 56,
72-89; Michael Tonry, Parsimony and Desert in Sentencing, in PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 198, 199, 201-04 (Andrew
von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed. 1998). The Model Penal Code and
all three editions of the American Bar Association sentencing standards ex-
plicitly or implicitly recognized the principle of parsimony. Frase, Limiting Re-
tributivism, supra note 104, at 94-95. The principle is also endorsed in the
proposed revisions of the Model Penal Code sentencing provisions. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a)(iii) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004); id. cmt. at 11-12.
120. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 79-83 (2003) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that there was no reason to believe that, because defen-
dant shoplifted twice, an additional twenty-five-year sentence was necessary
to achieve crime-control purposes); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 40 (2003)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that the prosecution did not show that a se-
vere three strikes law was necessary to deter the defendant's crime); Rummel
v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 302 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that there
was no showing that a life sentence was necessary to deter others or incapaci-
tate a violent offender). See infra Part III for a discussion of numerous exam-
ples of means proportionality principles applied in other areas of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence.
121. Roy G. Spece, Jr., Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny and the Least Re-
strictive Alternative as a Superior Form of Intermediate Review: Civil Com-




3. The Ends and Means Proportionality Principles in Action
A good example of the operation of these two utilitarian
proportionality concepts is found in the criminal law require-
ments for a valid claim of self defense. 122 Each of these re-
quirements is independent-a violation of either one results in
denial of a complete defense. Ends proportionality in self de-
fense requires that the defensive force used must not be exces-
sive relative to the threatened harm-you cannot kill an at-
tacker to avoid receiving a minor battery, even if killing is the
only effective available means of prevention.123 Means propor-
tionality in self defense (usually referred to as the necessity
principle) requires that the defensive means not be unnecessar-
ily harmful-you cannot kill to avoid being killed, even if kill-
ing is effective and proportional to the threat, if that threat
could also be avoided by nondeadly means (for instance, by the
use of superior strength). 24
122. Similarly, under the defense of necessity, ends proportionality is re-
quired in that the actor must choose what reasonably appears to be the lesser
evil (the harm caused by his criminal act cannot be equal to or greater than
the harm sought to be avoided). MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). Means proportionality is also required, in that the action must be
reasonably believed to be necessary (no noncriminal act or less serious crimi-
nal act would suffice to avoid the threatened harm). Id.
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence places similar
ends and means proportionality limits on police use of force to arrest or tem-
porarily seize a suspect. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
123. DRESSLER, supra note 100, at 49, 222.
124. Id. at 222. However, many jurisdictions decline to require a nonag-
gressor to "retreat" (or limit the duty to retreat in ways unrelated to neces-
sity), thus rejecting the strictest version of means proportionality. Id. at 226-
29.
Means proportionality, in the form of a requirement to impose the "least
restrictive alternative," is also well established in statutes and cases govern-
ing juvenile court dispositions, see, e.g., State ex rel. R.S. v. Trent, 289 S.E.2d
166 (W. Va. 1982), and regulating the use of involuntary civil commitment,
see, e.g., State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 300-01 (N.J. 1975). See generally, Spece,
supra note 121, at 1052-54. Elements of means proportionality analysis can
also be found in several cases involving alleged excessive force by prison
guards. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (reviewing allega-
tions that long after any safety concerns had abated, prison guards subjected
an inmate to unnecessary pain and discomfort, prolonged thirst, damaging ex-
posure to sun, taunting, and humiliation). Means proportionality (the princi-
ple of "parsimony"), as well as limiting retributive proportionality, are for-
mally recognized under the Minnesota sentencing guidelines. See generally
Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 104, at 98-104; Frase, Sentencing
Principles, supra note 104, at 388-408.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
III. EXAMPLES OF THE THREE PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The proportionality principles outlined above-limiting re-
tributive proportionality, utilitarian "ends" proportionality, and
utilitarian "means" proportionality-are well-established com-
ponents of many American constitutional law doctrines, both
within and outside the criminal justice context. Several of these
doctrines recognize two of these proportionality principles,
which operate as independent limitations on intrusive state
measures-a violation of either principle results in a finding of
unconstitutionality. Sometimes courts have explicitly used the
language of proportionality, usually without specifying which of
the three principles identified in this Article is being applied.1
25
In other cases, courts have clearly invoked a version of one or
both of the utilitarian proportionality principles, without men-
tioning proportionality as such.126
But why should proportionality principles explicitly or im-
plicitly recognized in very different fields of law be considered
relevant when defining Eighth Amendment limits on prison
sentences? Are not all legal doctrines context specific? When
the context changes, should not the doctrines also change?
These are legitimate and important objections, to which several
answers may be given.
Some of the doctrines discussed below involve criminal and
quasi-criminal penalties (capital punishment, fines and forfei-
tures, punitive damages) or procedural penalties (exclusionary
rules) which raise proportionality issues that are at least
analogous, if not directly comparable, to those posed by lengthy
prison terms. Of course, each punishment context has unique
features, but often the distinctions cut in both directions. 127 The
Supreme Court sometimes emphasizes these contextual differ-
ences, but it also sometimes disregards them. For example, the
Court has stated many times that death penalty law has lim-
ited application in nondeath cases; 128 yet the Court has cited
prison duration principles in death penalty cases, 29 and it re-
125. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 533 (1997); see
also infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003); see also infra
notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing whether
punitive damages merit stricter constitutional scrutiny than prison sentences).
128. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
129. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002). The Court has
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cently rejected "death-is-different" arguments in a decision de-
clining to apply a new death penalty ruling retroactively. 130 Fi-
nally, the differences between these various contexts cannot
easily explain the pattern of the Court's decisions-seeming to
recognize meaningful proportionality constraints in all pun-
ishment contexts other than that of prison duration. 131
A second broad group of proportionality doctrines exam-
ined below involves governmental measures that are not in-
tended as punishment but which, like criminal sentences, do
infringe on or deny important substantive or procedural rights
(such as bail, forced medication, administrative due process,
petty offense procedures, police powers under the Fourth
Amendment, and First Amendment and Equal Protection strict
scrutiny rules). A third group of proportionality doctrines has
nothing to do with individual rights (such as limits on congres-
sional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Dormant Commerce Clause limits on state powers). As to
both of these groups, it is again noteworthy that the Supreme
Court seems quite willing to recognize and apply proportional-
ity principles in contexts other than criminal punishment.
Many of these principles are endorsed by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who oppose placing any Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality limits on prison durations.
All of the proportionality doctrines discussed below, even
those in the third group, provide useful perspectives on ways of
defining proportionality limits for prison sentences. These doc-
trines demonstrate that proportionality principles can be and
often have been applied to government measures seeking to
achieve nonretributive goals. Moreover, all of these proportion-
ality principles, both retributive and nonretributive, are
deemed sufficiently fundamental to have been recognized as a
matter of federal constitutional law. Finally, the number and
diversity of these examples suggests that the core, underlying
proportionality principles are valid and widely accepted. Of
course, as was noted above, these principles have been, and
also cited prison duration cases in forfeiture and punitive damages cases. See
infra notes 141, 163 and accompanying text.
130. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2529-31 (2004) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
131. See generally Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Death is Different, "Is Money Dif-ferent? Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages-Shifting
Constitutional Paradigms for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 217 (2003).
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The Court has stated that the death penalty:
is "excessive" and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable con-
tribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffer-
ing; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. A
punishment might fail the test on either ground.
132
The second standard could reflect either limiting retributive or
utilitarian ends (burden versus benefit) proportionality, but the
Court's cases seem to focus almost entirely on the former.133
The first standard above is also ambiguous-it might only
stand for the minimum constitutional requirement of a rational
132. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the death
penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime of raping an adult woman); see
also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21 (recognizing retribution and deterrence of
capital crimes as two recognized purposes served by the death penalty; neither
justifies execution of mentally retarded offenders); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 798-801 (1982) (stating that retribution and deterrence are not
served by executing a felony murder accomplice who acted as the getaway
driver and did not kill, intend to kill, or contemplate that lethal force would be
used by his robbery accomplices); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(plurality opinion) ("[T]he inquiry into 'excessiveness' has two aspects. First,
the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain. Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the se-
verity of the crime.") (citations omitted).
133. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (finding that a mentally retarded of-
fender's lesser culpability does not merit the death penalty); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23, 834-37 (1988) (finding that a fifteen-year-
old offender's reduced culpability precluded the death penalty); Enmund, 458
U.S. at 800-01 (finding that the death penalty for felony murder accomplice
was excessive in retributive terms, relative to the defendant's intent and role
in the offense); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (holding Ohio's stat-
ute unconstitutional because it did not permit jury directly to consider poten-
tial mitigating factors such as lack of intent to kill, minor role in the offense,
or age); Coker, 433 U.S. at 598 ("[I]n terms of moral depravity and of the in-
jury to the person and to the public, [rape of an adult woman] does not com-
pare with murder."); Radin, supra note 14, at 1056 ("[A] punishment is exces-
sive and unconstitutional... if it inflicts more pain than the individual
deserves."); see also Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth
Amendment Challenges to the Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the
Supreme Court "From Precedent to Precedent," 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 26 (1985);
Gilchrist, supra note 99, at 1123-24.
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basis for state action.134 In the United States, this would not
usually be thought of as a question of proportionality, although
it is in Europe. 3 5 Alternatively, the second standard could im-
plicitly incorporate a means proportionality concept. On this
view, the death penalty is excessive relative to the next-most-
severe alternative penalty, life without parole, if the former
adds no measurable deterrent or other social benefits. 136 This
interpretation finds support in the Court's decisions invalidat-
ing the death penalty for felony accomplices,137 offenders under
sixteen years of age at the time of the crime, 138 and the men-
tally retarded. 13 9 In each of these cases the Court doubted that
the group of offenders at issue was deterrable at all, but the
question might also be posed in terms of whether the threat of
134. Gilchrist, supra note 99, at 1147. Actions which fail the rational basis
test might be seen as excessive, and therefore disproportionate, in the sense
that they impose totally useless costs or burdens.
135. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
136. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300-02 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (arguing that capital punishment is unconstitutional because it is
not a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment); id. at 331-32, 342-59(Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that life imprisonment adequately achieves
all of the legitimate purposes supposedly served by the death penalty); Mi-
chael Herz, Nearest to Legitimacy: Justice White and Strict Rational Basis
Scrutiny, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1329, 1352 (2003) ("[W]hat matters in determin-
ing whether capital punishment for a particular offense is 'needless' is the in-
cremental deterrent effect of capital punishment as opposed to lengthy, or life-
long, imprisonment."); Radin, supra note 14, at 1056 ("[A] punishment is ex-
cessive and unconstitutional if it inflicts suffering to which no net social gain
is attributable."); id. at 1062 (arguing that the proper level of scrutiny for
death sentences is "something approaching compelling state interest/least re-
strictive alternative analysis"); Gibbs, supra note 99, at 976 ("If there is a sig-
nificantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which
the punishment is inflicted, then this would also contribute to a conclusion of
disproportionality.") (citations omitted).
137. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-800; see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 624-28
(White, J., concurring).
138. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837-38.
139. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319-20 (2002), held that the in-
creased severity of executing mentally retarded offenders is unlikely to deter
such offenders (who do not calculate) or nonretarded offenders (who would
themselves still be eligible for death). In earlier cases several Justices opined
that "we cannot 'invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less se-
vere penalties adequate to serve the ends of penology."' Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 451(Powell, J., dissenting)). However, the later cases cited above (Enmund,
Thompson, and Atkins) seem to implicitly adopt a "less-would-do-just-as-well"
approach, at least for certain less deterrable offenders. Several Justices have
taken this view of the death penalty generally. See supra note 136 (discussing
the concurring opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall in Furman).
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a lesser penalty would likely provide whatever minimal deter-
rence these offenders would experience from the threat of re-
ceiving the death penalty.
2. Excessive Fines and Forfeitures
Several limitations on fine amounts are found in the
Magna Carta (1215),140 and excessive fines are expressly for-
bidden by the Eighth Amendment. Curiously, the Supreme
Court had no occasion to interpret the Excessive Fines Clause
until the 1990s, and then did so only in cases involving criminal
and civil forfeitures.' 4 ' In United States v. Bajakajian, the
Court found that an in personam criminal forfeiture of
$357,144 in cash, which the defendant had apparently acquired
legally but failed to report before attempting to take it out of
the country, violated the Excessive Fines Clause. 142 Justice
Thomas's opinion for the Court stressed the technical nature of
the defendant's crime and the minimal harm to the govern-
ment. Thomas applied a standard of gross disproportionality to
the gravity of the offense, citing Solem v. Helm (but not Har-
melin), and said that offense gravity for these purposes should
be measured by harm and culpability. 14 3 These criteria corre-
spond to the two traditional elements of blameworthiness, sug-
gesting a grounding in limiting retributive proportionality.
144
140. MAGNA CARTA, Ch. 20, 21, reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE:
FROM MAGNA CHARTA TO THE 14TH YEAR OF K. EDWARD III (Danby Pickering
ed., 1762) (stating that fines should be graded according to offense serious-
ness, and also should not deprive the offender of his livelihood).
141. In Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1993), the Court
recognized that in personam criminal forfeiture of the defendant's entire busi-
ness might constitute an excessive fine before remanding for determination of
that issue. In Austin v. United States, involving the in rem civil forfeiture of
the defendant's mobile home and auto body shop after he pled guilty to dis-
tributing cocaine, the Court remanded for determination of an excessive fines
issue after noting that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving ei-
ther retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment" and is thus subject to
the Excessive Fines Clause. 509 U.S. 602, 609-10, 622-23 (1993) (quoting
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
142. 524 U.S. 321, 334-40 (1998).
143. Id. at 336-37.
144. Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual: The Autonomous
Excessive Fines Clause and Desert-Based Constitutional Limits on Forfeitures
After United States v. Bajakajian, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 492-98; Pamela S.
Karlan, 'Pricking the Lines" The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and
Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 901 (2004); Van Cleave, supra
note 131, at 263-64.
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However, since forfeitures serve deterrent as well as retributive
purposes, 145 it is necessary to also apply a standard of utilitar-
ian "excessiveness." One commentator has suggested that some
forfeitures impose burdens out of proportion to the law en-
forcement benefits achieved (ends disproportionality), and are
also excessive in their unnecessary severity and over-
inclusiveness (means disproportionality).1 46
3. Excessive Bail
The Supreme Court has had little occasion to interpret the
meaning of "excessiveness" under the Eighth Amendment Ex-
cessive Bail Clause. In Stack v. Boyle,147 the Court stated that
the purpose of bail is to assure the presence of the accused at
trial and other hearings; "[b]ail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "'exces-
sive' under the Eighth Amendment." 148 This language implies a
form of means proportionality-if a lower bail amount would
suffice, any higher bail is excessive.
145. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618 (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974)).
146. Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory Application of Substantive Due
Process: A Tale of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453, 482.
147. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
148. Id. at 5. But see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not require setting of bail, nor does
it limit permissible governmental interests to the prevention of flight). The
Amendment merely requires that the "conditions of release or detention not be
'excessive' in light of the perceived evil." Id. The state's legitimate interests
may include prevention of further crime and/or threats to witnesses, as well as
prevention of flight.
Salerno also held that pretrial detention to prevent further crimes would
violate substantive due process if it constituted "punishment," either as a mat-
ter of express legislative intent or because the detention appears excessive in
relation to all nonpunitive ("regulatory") purposes which could rationally be
served by such detention. Id. at 747. This language might suggest ends and/or
means proportionality limits; preventive detention cannot be more onerous
than the crimes it prevents, nor more onerous than necessary to prevent those
crimes. However, the point of the due process standard may not be excessive-
ness itself, but rather the impermissible punitive purposes which can be in-
ferred from such excess. Some scholars have suggested that a similar desire
"to flush out illicit actual motivations" underlies the "narrowly-tailored" re-
quirement of strict scrutiny analysis. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 136, at 1348-
49 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 146 (1980)). In any case, the absence of express or implied
punitive motives may mean that (limiting) retributive limits are inapplicable
to bail and preventive detention decisions.
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Some state statutes, codes, and case law, and pretrial de-
tention rules in other countries, apply an offense-based crite-
rion as one factor and/or as an absolute upper limit on the
amount of bail (e.g., some multiple of the maximum fine for the
most serious offense charged). 149 This approach appears to re-
flect limiting retributive and/or utilitarian ends proportional-
ity-the expense and hardship of high bail are not justified by
the defendant's alleged blameworthiness and/or the states' in-
terest in the prosecution. A good test case under the offense-
based approach would be a minor shoplifter or check forger
with a high risk of flight-such an offender may flee unless bail
is set very high (hence, no means proportionality problem), but
the burdens of high bail or pretrial detention may outweigh the
offender's deserved sentence and/or the value to society of ob-
taining a conviction.
4. Long Prison Sentences
To complete this review of Eighth Amendment proportion-
ality principles it is useful to consider which kinds of propor-
tionality are implicit in the Supreme Court's proposed stan-
dards for assessing claims of excessiveness in prison sentences,
that is, the three factors spelled out in Solem v. Helm 150 and at
least partially reaffirmed in Harmelin and Ewing. In assessing
the gravity of the defendant's crime in relation to the sentence
(the first factor), the Court in Solem appeared to focus on re-
tributive elements, i.e., the harm caused by the offense, and the
defendant's culpability (intent and motive). 51 But if, as the Ew-
ing plurality opinion asserts, the defendant's prior convictions
are also relevant to the "gravity" of his offense, and the state's
goals of deterrence and incapacitation of recidivists are also
relevant, then even the first Solem factor must include ends
and/or means proportionality assessments.152
149. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 629.471 (2000) (setting maximum bail in mis-
demeanor and gross misdemeanor cases at double the highest fine authorized
for that offense; for selected offenses, the maxima are four times or six times
the highest fine); Exparte Thomas, 815 So. 2d 592, 595 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)
(per curiam) (applying a "rough-rule-of-thumb" whereby bail equals $1000
times the maximum sentence (in years) the accused could face for the charged
crimes). For a discussion of German proportionality limits on custodial arrest
and pretrial detention, see infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
150. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). For a description of these factors, see supra notes
34-36 and accompanying text.
151. 463 U.S. at 292.
152. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28-31 (2003).
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As for the second Solem factor, comparing sentences for
other crimes in the same state, both retributive and utilitarian
ends proportionality may be relevant. If much more serious
crimes often receive the same or lower penalties, this implies
that the defendant has received punishment in excess of his de-
serts, and/or sentence burdens unjustified by the social harms
prevented. 153 Under the third Solem factor, comparing sen-
tences imposed for the same crime in other states, all three
forms of proportionality may be relevant. If similar offenders in
other states receive much less severe penalties, this implies re-
tributive disproportionality (sentences in the home state exceed
desert), and/or ends disproportionality (sentence burdens are
not justified by social harms), and/or means disproportionality
(lower penalties would likely be adequate in the home state).
The Supreme Court's Solem factors are not the only stan-
dards courts have used to provide objective factors to structure
proportionality review of lengthy prison sentences. For exam-
ple, the Illinois courts have developed a different three-pronged
approach under the proportionate penalties clause of the state
constitution. Article I, Section 11 of the Illinois Constitution
declares that "[a]ll penalties shall be determined ... according
to the seriousness of the offense." 154 The Illinois Supreme Court
has held that a penalty violates this provision if any of the fol-
lowing tests is met:
(1) if the penalty "is a cruel or degrading punishment not known
to the common law, or is a degrading punishment which had become
obsolete in the State prior to the adoption of its constitution, or is so
wholly disproportioned to the offense committed as to shock the moral
sense of the community";155
(2) if offenses with similar legislative purposes are compared and
"conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and
safety is punished more harshly";156
153. Means disproportionality would not be implied, since the minimum
degree of adequate punishment to achieve utilitarian crime-control purposes is
not necessarily correlated with crime seriousness.
154. ILL. CONST. art. I., § 11.
155. People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 307-09 (Ill. 2002) (citation omitted)
(invalidating a life-without-parole sentence given to a fifteen-year-old who be-
came a murder accomplice just before the shooting, noting that "this case pre-
sents the least culpable offender imaginable").
156. People v. Davis, 687 N.E.2d 24, 28-29 (Ill. 1997) (citation omitted) (in-
validating a penalty for failure to have a firearm owner's card that was greater
than penalty for unlawfully using such a firearm).
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(3) if the offense has a higher penalty than another offense with
identical substantive elements.57
None of these tests bears a close resemblance to any of the
Solem factors as currently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court. As explained below, the first and second tests are nar-
rower than the first and second Solem factors, and none of the
Illinois tests involve comparisons to penalties in other jurisdic-
tions (the third Solem factor). However, each of the Illinois
tests appears to incorporate one or more of the three propor-
tionality principles identified in this Article. The final clause of
the first Illinois test appears to be based on a limiting retribu-
tive theory--crime-control goals and the offender's prior record
are not mentioned, only the offender's current offense. The ul-
timate standard, "so wholly disproportionate ... as to shock the
moral sense of the community," suggests a criterion based on
blameworthiness and the Illinois Supreme Court has empha-
sized offender culpability when interpreting this standard.158
The second Illinois test involves a more limited form of in-
trajurisdictional comparison than the second Solem factor-
only offenses reflecting similar legislative purposes are com-
pared, and the relative severity of crimes is tied explicitly to so-
cial harms. The focus on harm suggests a theory of utilitarian
ends proportionality (which, unlike retributive proportionality,
does not give substantial weight to offender culpability159). The
third Illinois test (invalidating different penalties for identical
crimes) may be based more on notions of due process (lack of
rational basis and/or concerns about abuse of prosecutorial dis-
cretion) than on proportionality, but this test could incorporate
all three proportionality principles identified in this Article. If
identical crimes receive different penalties there is a substan-
tial risk that offenders who receive the more severe penalty
have been punished in excess of their deserts, that the benefits
achieved by the more severe penalty are not worth the greater
burdens on defendants, and/or that the greater penalty is not
needed to achieve all relevant sentencing purposes.
157. People v. Lewis, 677 N.E.2d 830, 831-33 (Ill. 1996) (citation omitted)
(invalidating penalty for armed violence that was greater than penalty for
identical offense of armed robbery).
158. Miller, 781 N.E.2d at 307. The other two clauses of the first test ap-
pear to prohibit severe punishments based on "original meaning" and desue-
tude.
159. See supra Part II.
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B. PROPORTIONALITY RULES UNDER THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSES
1. Punitive Damages
In a series of cases beginning in the late 1980s, the Su-
preme Court imposed proportionality limits on punitive dam-
ages awards under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. These limitations appear to reflect
both limiting retributive and utilitarian means proportionality
principles.
The Court first held that punitive damages awards are
subject to due process limits in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip.160 The Court noted that punitive damages are
"quasi-criminal"; that they are imposed for purposes of retribu-
tion and deterrence; and that they must be "reasonable in their
amount and rational in light of [the above purposes]."'161 The
Court also suggested that such awards must not be "grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the offense and [must] have
some understandable relationship to compensatory dam-
ages."162 The award in that case was upheld although it was
more than four times the compensatory damages awarded, and
more than 200 times the plaintiffs out-of-pocket expenses. 163
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,164 the Court, citing
Solem v. Helm (but not Harmelin), held that due process pro-
hibits punitive damages awards that are "grossly excessive" in
relation to the goals of punishment and deterrence. 165 The
Court pointed to three factors which together supported the
conclusion that the $2 million award against BMW arising out
of a violation of the state's consumer protection law was grossly
excessive: "[(1)] the degree of reprehensibility of [BMW's] non-
disclosure; [(2)] the disparity between the harm or potential
harm suffered by Dr. Gore and his punitive damages award
[500 times the compensatory damages award]; and [(3)] the dif-
ference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized
160. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). The Court had previously held that punitive dam-
ages are not covered by the Excessive Fines Clause. Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989).
161. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19, 21.
162. Id. at 22.
163. Id. at 23.
164. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
165. Id. at 574-76.
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or imposed in comparable cases."166 The Court's reference to the
defendant corporation's "reprehensibility" (which it added, is
"perhaps the most important" factor) 167 and its later discussion
of the defendant's "blameworthiness,"' 168 suggest that the Court
was primarily imposing retributive upper limits on punitive
damages awards. But here, as in the case of prison durations
and forfeitures, the Court's recognition of deterrence as a valid
purpose underlying such awards 169 requires a nonretributive
concept of "excessiveness." At one point in its opinion, the Court
suggested a utilitarian means proportionality limitation:
The sanction imposed in this case cannot be justified on the
ground that it was necessary to deter future misconduct without con-
sidering whether less drastic remedies could be expected to achieve
that goal. The fact that a multimillion dollar penalty prompted a
change in policy sheds no light on the question whether a lesser de-
terrent would have adequately protected the interests of Alabama
consumers.
170
Later cases have further elaborated the due process pro-
portionality limits on punitive damages awards. In Cooper In-
dustries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,17 1 the Court
showed little concern for judicial restraint or federalism, hold-
ing that punitive damages awards should be reviewed de novo,
under the substantive standards announced in Gore. In State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,172 the
Court's relatively nondeferential review standards were justi-
fied on the grounds that, although punitive damages awards
have the same goals as criminal punishments, they lack crimi-
nal due process safeguards, thus raising "an acute danger of
arbitrary deprivation of property."1 73 Strangely, the Court does
not seem to be nearly as concerned with the danger of arbitrary
and extreme deprivations of physical liberty, in the context of
very long prison sentences. 174 Nor has the Court required a
166. Id. at 574-75.
167. Id. at 575.
168. See id; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 422-24 (2003) (discussing "reprehensibility analysis").
169. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 416; Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); Gore, 517 U.S. at 568;
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
170. Gore, 517 U.S. at 584.
171. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
172. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
173. Id. at 417 (citation omitted).
174. The factors suggesting equally acute dangers of excessive criminal
sentences are discussed below. See infra notes 320-22 and accompanying text.
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"threshold" showing of gross disproportionality before subject-
ing punitive damages awards to comparative analysis (dam-
ages awards and civil penalties for the same conduct). Finally,
in assessing punitive damages awards, the Court has added a
limitation on the relevance of the defendant's "prior record":
only violations of a similar nature may be considered. 175 Thus,
in at least three respects-de novo review, more frequent use of
comparative analysis, and more lenient treatment of recidi-
vists-the Court seems to be much more protective of civil de-
fendants' bank accounts than it has been of criminal defen-
dants' liberty.
Of course, there are differences between the punitive dam-
ages and sentencing contexts, but the differences cut in both di-
rections. 176 Punitive damages awards arguably justify stricter
constitutional scrutiny than prison sentences for several rea-
sons: damages awards can only be reviewed by the Supreme
Court (not lower federal courts); they are imposed by untrained
and unconstrained local juries, not judges and legislators; and
they can be objectively compared to the size of the accompany-
ing compensatory damages award. 177 On the other hand, dam-
ages only involve money, not physical liberty. The complaining
party is usually a large company much better able to defend it-
self than most criminal defendants and trial judges can set
aside excessive damages claims, whereas criminal defendants
often have no subconstitutional law remedies against excessive
prison terms. 178
2. Limits on Forced Medication
In a series of cases the Court has held that inmates and
persons awaiting trial have a due process liberty interest in
avoiding forced medication with antipsychotic drugs. In Sell v.
United States, the Court held that:
175. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at 422-24. Furthermore, the
Court suggested that "as a general rule ... a State [does not] have a legitimate
concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts
committed outside of the State's jurisdiction." Id. at 421.
176. See Karlan, supra note 144, at 903-14; Van Cleave, supra note 131, at
253-58. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, The Supreme Court's Backwards
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive
Criminal Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1249 (2000).
177. See Karlan, supra note 144, at 906-14.
178. See Gershowitz, supra note 176, at 1253-55.
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the Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal
charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial,
but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially
unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the
trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary
significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests
[which exists where the offender is charged with a "serious crime"
against person or property]. 179
The reviewing court then "must find that any alternative,
less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially
the same results. s1 8 0 The court must also consider less intrusive
means for administering the drugs, e.g., ordering the defendant
to take the drugs before forcibly administering them, and it
must assure that administration of the drugs is in the patient's
best medical interest in light of his medical condition, the po-
tential side effects, and the likely effectiveness of the drugs in
his case.18 1
These standards embody independent ends and means
proportionality principles. Forced medication violates ends pro-
portionality principles if the loss of liberty and attendant medi-
cal risks outweigh the importance of the charges and the prob-
able effectiveness of the drugs in restoring competence and
assuring a fair trial. Forced medication violates means propor-
tionality if there are less intrusive means of restoring compe-
tency or of administering the drugs.
3. Administrative Due Process
The Supreme Court's requirements for procedural due
process in administrative agency proceedings incorporate a
form of ends proportionality. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court
declined to grant evidentiary hearings on demand in all cases
prior to termination of disability benefits.1 8 2 Three factors were
deemed relevant in deciding the requirements of administra-
tive due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
179. 539 U.S. 166, 179-80 (2003); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127
(1992) (pretrial detainee); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (prison
inmate).
180. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
181. Id.
182. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. S3
In Mathews, the Court concluded that the burdens of the
requested procedural safeguard would outweigh the benefits
such a safeguard would provide.18 4 This is essentially a version
of ends proportionality, comparing the marginal benefits gained
by added procedural safeguards with the added cost and ad-
ministrative burdens of those safeguards. Note, however, that a
finding of disproportionality in this context works in favor of
the government, not the citizen.
4. Petty Offense Limits on Criminal Procedure Guarantees
In several cases, the Supreme Court has held that lower
standards of due process apply to minor crimes. Baldwin v.
New York held that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right does
not apply to crimes punishable with incarceration of six months
or less.18 5 A different but analogous rule limits the scope of the
automatic Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to appointed
counsel, recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright.SG The Court has
held that in misdemeanor cases the Gideon right to appointed
counsel applies only if the actual sentence imposed includes
some period of incarceration,18 7 or at least a suspended custody
term.188 Similar rules are found in state statutes and rules of
criminal procedure, granting offenders charged with minor vio-
lations fewer rights of appointed counsel, defense discovery,
jury trial, and jury size-what might be called "making the
procedure fit the crime." 18 9 The implicit rationale of these rules
is similar to that explicitly adopted by the Court in Mathews-
that in minor cases the benefits of additional procedural safe-
guards (reduced risk of erroneous or unfair outcomes, multi-
plied by the severity of those outcomes) are outweighed by the
183. Id. at 335. But see Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (de-
clining to apply Mathews to procedural requirements in state criminal prose-
cutions).
184. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347.
185. 399 U.S. 66 (1968).
186. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
187. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
188. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
189. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (jury size); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.02
(appointed counsel); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9 (pretrial discovery); MINN. R. CRIM. P.
26.01, subd. 1 (jury trial right).
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costs and administrative burdens of such safeguards. 190 Again,
this is a form of ends proportionality, and a finding of dispro-
portionality favors the government, not the citizen.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSIONARY RULES
The Court has often used implicit proportionality argu-
ments to justify limitations on the scope of exclusionary reme-
dies for violations of constitutionally protected rights. For ex-
ample, a cost-benefit rule premised on ends proportionality has
been used to admit evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on
an invalid search warrant, 191 to limit the number of persons
granted "standing" to contest police illegalities, 192 and to permit
impeachment use of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment or the Miranda rule. 193 The Court often
concludes that the added deterrence of police illegality that
would be obtained by applying or extending the exclusionary
rule in the manner sought by the defendant is outweighed by
the cost of excluding reliable evidence. 194
A different ends proportionality argument underlies an-
other limitation on exclusionary remedies, the "attenuation"
doctrine. In Brown v. Illinois, the Court recognized four factors
as relevant to whether the causal link between an illegal arrest
190. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (reasoning that further extension of the
GideonlArgersinger right to appointed counsel would "impose unpredictable,
but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States").
191. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (determining ad-
missibility by "weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the
prosecution's case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence").
192. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978).
193. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
194. See, e.g., Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (stat-
ing that costs of extending exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings are not
justified by limited probable increase in deterrence of police misconduct).
Recently, several Justices have suggested that some constitutional crimi-
nal procedure rights or exclusionary remedies may also be subject to a "no-
more-than-necessary" test reflecting means proportionality principles. In his
plurality opinion (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) in
United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004), Justice Thomas repeatedly
stressed the need to maintain "the closest possible fit between the Self-
Incrimination Clause and any rule designed to protect it." Id. at 2628; see also
id. at 2627 ("[A]ny further extension of these [Miranda] rules must be justified
by its necessity."); id. at 2628 (stating the "close fit" requirement); id. at 2629-
30 (requiring the "closest possible fit"). A similar necessity test, applicable to
the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege itself, was suggested in another




and a subsequent confession would be deemed sufficiently at-
tenuated to allow the confession to be admitted in the prosecu-
tion's case: whether Miranda warnings were given; the tempo-
ral proximity between the illegality and the confession; the
presence or absence of intervening circumstances; "and particu-
larly, the purpose and flagrancy" of the illegal arrest. 195 Thus,
it appears that the gravity of the police "offense" against the
constitution is the most important factor in determining the
scope of the exclusionary rule-more egregious illegalities jus-
tify exclusion of more remote evidentiary fruits.196 The implicit
reasoning is similar to one of Bentham's arguments in favor of
punishments proportional to crime seriousness: "The greater an
offence is, the greater reason there is to hazard a severe pun-
ishment for the chance of preventing it."197
As was true in the contexts of administrative due process
and adjudication procedures for petty crimes, discussed above,
a finding of disproportionality in assessing the scope of exclu-
sionary remedies favors the government, not the citizen.
D. POLICE POWERS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Utilitarian ends and means proportionality principles are
implicit in many of the Court's decisions defining the scope of
police search and seizure powers, and have sometimes been ex-
plicitly recognized.
1. Limits on Police Powers in Less Serious Cases
In Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court used ends proportionality
principles to hold that the police could not make a warrantless,
exigent circumstances entry of a person's house to effect an ar-
rest for a nonjailable drunk driving offense.198 The officers had
probable cause to arrest, and also had a very plausible claim
that delaying the arrest until a warrant was obtained would
have resulted in the loss of crucial evidence of intoxication. The
Court noted that many lower courts have viewed the serious-
195. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (emphasis added).
196. See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2(4)(1975) (proposing that, unless constitutionally required, a motion to suppress
evidence "shall be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which
it was based was substantial," considering the degree and willfulness of the
violation, the extent of the privacy invasion, and the extent to which exclusion
would serve to prevent violations).
197. BENTHAM, supra note 110, at 326.
198. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
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ness of the offense as an important factor in assessing the rea-
sonableness of a warrantless entry. 199 The Court also cited Jus-
tice Jackson's view that warrantless entry to arrest for a minor
offense would display "a shocking lack of all sense of propor-
tion."200 Although drunk driving poses major risks to persons
and property, the Court considered the Wisconsin legislature's
decision, classifying first-time violations as nonjailable, civil of-
fenses, to be the best indication of the extent of the State's in-
terest in making an arrest and enforcing this law.
20 1
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court relied on both
ends and means proportionality principles to limit police use of
deadly force to arrest a fleeing suspect. 20 2 The Court held that
such force may not be used unless the suspect is reasonably be-
lieved to pose a significant threat of death or serious physical
injury to the officer or others, or has committed a crime involv-
ing the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical
harm.20 3 Garner reflects ends proportionality. The Court ex-
pressly assumed it is better that a nonviolent suspect flee than
that he be killed. 20 4 The decision in Garner may also be based
in part on means proportionality. Noting that a majority of
American police departments forbid their officers to use deadly
force against nonviolent suspects, the Court concluded "there is
a substantial basis for doubting that the use of such force is an
essential attribute of the arrest power in all felony cases."20 5 In
other words, nondeadly force appears adequate to enforce the
law against nonviolent suspects.
199. Id. at 751-52 (citing Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392
(1970)).
200. Id. at 750-51 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459
(1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
201. Id. at 754; cf. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 335-36 (2001) (dis-
tinguishing Welsh and rejecting a proportionality argument). The offense in
McArthur was punishable with up to thirty days in jail, and the police intru-
sion (barring the suspect from entering his home unsupervised for two hours
until a search warrant was obtained) was less serious than the warrantless
home entry in Welsh. Id.
202. 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
203. Id. at 3, 11-12. The Court thus implicitly adopted the standard for use
of deadly force found in MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(iv) (and the lower
court explicitly did so, 471 U.S. at 6 n.7). The linkage of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standards with the Model Penal Code justification rules shows
that constitutional and nonconstitutional proportionality principles draw from
similar underlying values.




Ends and means proportionality principles have also been
used to assess claims of excessive nondeadly force in making
arrests, investigatory stops, and other seizures of the person. In
Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held that three factors
should be considered in such cases: "the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively re-
sisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."206 The
first and second factors reflect ends proportionality; as in Gar-
ner, the Court is saying that the force police use to effect a sei-
zure may be excessive relative to the benefits of such force, as
measured by the seriousness of the suspected crime or the sus-
pect's dangerousness. The third Graham factor may reflect
means proportionality-in the absence of resistance or flight,
police force may exceed what is necessary to effect the seizure.
Dicta in United States v. Hensley suggest that completed
crimes less serious than a felony would not permit the use of
Terry stop-and-frisk powers,20 7 and some lower courts have
adopted this ends-proportionality-based rule.208 Moreover, in a
variety of other contexts lower courts have considered the seri-
ousness of the offense to be an important factor in determining
issues of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, particularly with
regard to the use of intrusive police powers. 20 9 A similar ends
206. 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
207. 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
208. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883-84
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 381 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1986)
(finding that Hensley was inapplicable to a misdemeanor committed two
months earlier); cf. State v. Stich, 399 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(upholding stop to investigate misdemeanor committed "moments" before).
209. For example, many courts have invalidated suspicionless strip
searches of jail inmates charged with traffic or other minor crimes. See, e.g.,
Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993); Mary Beth G. v. City of
Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Shelby County, 95 F. Supp.
2d 1258, 1262-63 (N.D. Ala. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d
1340 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that eight federal circuits have condemned blan-
ket strip search policies applied to minor-offense detainees). Similarly, long
before the Supreme Court's decision in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740
(1984), most lower courts had considered the seriousness of the offense an im-
portant factor in assessing whether exigent circumstances permit warrantless
entry of a home. See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (1970). Of-
fense severity has also been cited in numerous other Fourth Amendment
cases. See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitu-
tional Carte Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 461 (2002); William A. Schroeder, Fac-
toring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations-
Warrantless Entries Into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U.
KAN. L. REV. 439, 444 n.26 (1990). The pros and cons of basing rules on this
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proportionality principle underlies the common law rule, still
recognized in some form by most states2 10 forbidding war-
rantless arrest for misdemeanors not committed within the ar-
resting officer's presence.
2. Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness Balancing"
The cases cited above can also be viewed as applications of
the Court's balancing approach under the Reasonableness
Clause of the Fourth Amendment-the strength of the govern-
ment interests supporting the search or seizure are weighed
against the nature and degree of the intrusion on the citizen's
privacy, liberty, and/or property rights. The Court has often
used this approach to uphold warrantless-and usually also
suspicionless-searches of regulated industries; automobile and
jail inventories; immigration and drunk driving roadblocks;
drug testing and other searches of high school students, public
employees, and convicts; and various other intrusions.211 On
the "government interest" side of the balance, the Court exam-
ines a wide range of factors, including the seriousness and im-
mediacy of the harm sought to be prevented, the degree of indi-
vidualized or target-group suspicion, the presence of a warrant,
warrant-substitute, or other limits on police discretion, the fea-
sibility of applying individualized suspicion and warrant re-
quirements in this context, the importance of the evidence or
other expected fruits of the intrusion, the availability of other
means to achieve the government's interest, and the effective-
ness of the means chosen. 2 12 These factors reflect both ends and
means proportionality principles.
factor are discussed in Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional
Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957 (2004).
210. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 10.02 (3d ed. 2002); William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests
and the Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 777 (1993); see also Thomas
Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in At-
water v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 322-26 (2002) (discussing
other common law distinctions between felony and misdemeanor arrest pow-
ers). The Court has never decided whether any aspect of the in-presence rule
is enforceable under the Fourth Amendment. See Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 n.ll (2001).
211. The Court's balancing approach is extensively discussed in Richard S.
Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 348-89 (2002). For a
more recent case using balancing, see Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
212. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 210, §§ 18.01 to 19.05.
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Although Fourth Amendment proportionality principles
have been articulated by a number of scholars, 213 the Court has
never explicitly sought to justify its reasonableness balancing
approach or decisions on proportionality grounds. However, at
least one Justice has cited proportionality principles in dissent.
Ironically, that Justice was Sandra Day O'Connor-the author
of the Ewing plurality opinion that adopted the narrow propor-
tionality principle from Justice Kennedy's Harmelin concur-
rence. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court refused to en-
gage in case-specific balancing, and upheld the custodial arrest
of a woman for violation of a seat belt law punishable only by a
$50 fine. 214 In her forceful dissent, Justice O'Connor argued
that Atwater's arrest was disproportionate not only in relation
to the nature and seriousness of her offense 2 15 (ends propor-
tionality), but also relative to any legitimate case-specific need
to take her into custody2 16 (means proportionality). Atwater
was a long-time resident of the town, her identity was well
known to the arresting officer, and there was no reason to fear
imminent danger or continued violations if she were released
on citation, which is the normal procedure in such cases. 217 Jus-
tice O'Connor thus clearly approved of both ends and means
proportionality principles.
213. See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
"Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1724-25 (1998); Frase, supra note
211, at 389-94; Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuve-
nation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053 (1998);
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment. 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 51-55 (1991). Other Fourth Amendment articles which implicitly ap-
ply proportionality principles include: Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 785 (1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 436-37 (1974);
Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the
Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 COLO. L.
REV. 693, 719-24 (1998); Schroeder, supra note 209, at 530; and William J.
Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transubstantive Fourth Amend-
ment, 114 HARv. L. REV. 842, 869-76 (2000).
214. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). See generally
Frase, supra note 211, at 342-74, 407-15 (critiquing the Court's ruling in At-
water and proposing workable limits which state courts and rule drafters
should impose on arrests in minor traffic cases).
215. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 364.
216. Id. at 372.
217. Id. at 370-71.
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E. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES
In a variety of other contexts, the Court has adopted one or
both utilitarian proportionality principles. Some Justices have
explicitly used the language of proportionality, occasionally
recognizing both ends and means proportionality concepts.2 18
1. First Amendment Cases
Both forms of utilitarian proportionality analysis are re-
flected in the requirements that content-based restrictions on
political speech in a public forum must be necessary to serve a
compelling state interest, and must also be narrowly drawn.
219
Restrictions will be struck down if their burdens on free speech
rights are not supported by sufficiently weighty state interests
(ends proportionality), or if the restrictions are broader than
necessary to achieve their valid purposes (means proportional-
ity). These ends and means proportionality requirements oper-
ate independently; a violation of either one will invalidate the
speech restriction.220 Similar independent requirements of
compelling state interest and narrow tailoring apply to laws
burdening religious practice that are not neutral or not of gen-
eral application. 22 1 Analogous but looser ends and means pro-
portionality limits apply to regulation of commercial speech.
222
218. In addition to the examples cited here, the Court has invoked some-
thing akin to the ends proportionality principle when evaluating government
"takings" of private property. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
388-91 (1994) (requiring "rough proportionality" between the onerousness of
required building permit conditions and the adverse impact of the project on
public interests, that is, the interests which justify imposing the permit condi-
tions).
219. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
220. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118-23 (1991) (holding that although the state had
a compelling interest in ensuring that crime victims are compensated, the
challenged law was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve that goal);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971) (holding, without reaching re-
quirements for narrowly-tailored regulation, that a conviction for disturbing
the peace, based on the defendant's wearing of jacket with the words "fuck the
draft," violated the First Amendment; the state cannot ban such language
from public discourse either on the theory that its use is "inherently likely to
cause violent reaction" or on the ground that states are "guardians of public
morality").
221. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993).
222. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 564-66 (1980). The Court found that to regulate commercial speech
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In certain First Amendment contexts some Justices have
endorsed a lower (but still "heightened") level of scrutiny which
appears to explicitly incorporate both ends and means propor-
tionality principles. In his concurring opinion in United States
v. American Library Association, Justice Breyer used this ap-
proach to uphold the Children's Internet Protection Act, a fed-
eral statute conditioning the grant of subsidies to public librar-
ies on the installation of technology to help prevent library
computer users from gaining Internet access to pornography
and other material comparably harmful to minors. 223 Justice
Breyer believed that neither "rational basis" nor "strict scru-
tiny" analysis was appropriate. Instead, he argued, the Act
should be evaluated:
as the Court has examined speech-related restrictions in other con-
texts where circumstances call for heightened, but not "strict," scru-
tiny-where, for example, complex, competing constitutional interests
are potentially at issue or speech-related harm is potentially justified
by unusually strong governmental interests....
In such cases the Court has asked whether the harm to speech-
related interests is disproportionate in light of both the justifications
and the potential alternatives. It has considered the legitimacy of the
statute's objective, the extent to which the statute will tend to achieve
that objective, whether there are other, less restrictive ways of
achieving that objective, and ultimately whether the statute works
speech-related harm that, in relation to that objective, is out of pro-
portion. 224
Justice Breyer's examination of the government's objec-
tives and the extent to which the statute achieves them in-
volves questions of ends proportionality; his consideration of
less restrictive ways to achieve those objectives represents a
means proportionality analysis.
which is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the state must
assert a "substantial interest" to be achieved by the restrictions, and:
the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The
limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the
State's goal ... [as] measured by two criteria. First, the restriction
must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may
not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for
the government's purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could
be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech,
the excessive restrictions cannot survive.
Id.
223. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 215 (2003) (Breyer,
J., concurring).




The strict scrutiny given to certain classifications under
the Equal Protection Clause incorporates elements of both ends
and means proportionality. Such classifications (e.g., based on
race, or impinging on the exercise of fundamental rights) must
be justified by a "compelling governmental interest" (lesser
"ends" can never justify such a classification), and the govern-
ment's chosen means to effectuate its purposes must be "nar-
rowly tailored to the achievement of that goal."225 So-called "in-
termediate scrutiny," such as that applicable to gender-based
classifications, 226 may also incorporate elements of ends and
means proportionality, albeit in very attenuated form. Such
classifications are invalid unless they serve "important gov-
ernmental objectives" and the means employed are "substan-
tially related to the achievement of those objectives." 227 At both
levels of scrutiny, the implicit ends and means proportionality
requirements operate independently-a violation of either re-
quirement will invalidate the challenged classification. 228
3. Federal Legislation Enforcing Fourteenth
Amendment Rights
Proportionality principles have been expressly cited by the
Court in cases deciding whether Congress has overstepped its
proper role when enacting laws under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In City of Boerne v. Flores, for example, the
Court held that "there must be congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end."229 The Court's underlying concern is that
courts, not Congress, should define the substantive scope of
Fourteenth Amendment rights; legislative remedies which go
far beyond existing rights may in effect broaden the rights
themselves.2 30 This concern suggests an overbreadth analysis
225. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 280, 283-84
(1986).
226. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
227. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001) (citations omitted).
228. See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200 (assuming that traffic safety is an
important government interest, but holding that the higher drinking age
Oklahoma imposed on males was not shown to be substantially related to
achievement of that interest).
229. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
230. Id. at 519-20.
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akin to means proportionality, and this interpretation finds
support in later cases and commentary on Boerne.231
4. Dormant Commerce Clause Cases
In evaluating state regulations burdening interstate com-
merce, the Court has used an approach which "necessarily in-
volves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the
state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden im-
posed on the course of interstate commerce."232 This weighing
or balancing approach could incorporate both forms of utilitar-
ian proportionality analysis, but in practice seems to focus
more on ends proportionality. For example, in cases invalidat-
ing state law limits on oversized semitrailers the Court has
concluded that the substantial burden on interstate commerce
imposed by these laws outweighed the safety dangers suppos-
edly associated with these trucks. 233 It would also be possible to
attack such regulations on means proportionality grounds, but
the Court did not discuss whether more narrowly tailored
truck-size regulations would have adequately met all of the
State's asserted safety concerns.
231. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-48 (1999). One recent analysis of the
Boerne line of cases discusses the ends and means proportionality rules found
in European law (discussed infra) and suggests that Boerne reflects a means
proportionality principle. See Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality
for Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?
78 IND. L.J. 567, 580, 584-85 (2003). Other articles have reached similar con-
clusions, without specifically distinguishing between ends and means propor-
tionality. See Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of
Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21
CARDOzO L. REV. 469, 477-82 (1999) (arguing that the proportionality re-
quirement of Boerne is grounded in traditional rules limiting remedies to what
is necessary to ensure that the wronged party's rights are fully restored); Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 166 (1997) ("[Tlhe Boerne Court re-
placed something akin to 'rational basis scrutiny' with a narrow tailoring re-
quirement typical of intermediate scrutiny.").
232. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978).
233. Id. at 447; Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662,
678 (1981). The Court appears to deem any dangers to be minor, given the




The preceding discussion reveals examples of all three pro-
portionality concepts, operating independently of each other
and in widely differing areas of the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence. The limiting retributive proportionality
principle, which specifies that sanctions must not exceed the
offender's just deserts as measured by harm and culpability,
has been applied to capital punishment, fines and forfeitures,
and punitive damages. Ends proportionality principles, which
demand that the chosen or proposed means must not cost or in-
trude more than the benefits they achieve, have been applied to
forced medication; administrative due process standards; adju-
dication procedures for petty crimes; exclusionary rules; police
investigatory powers; and in First Amendment, Equal Protec-
tion, and Commerce Clause cases. Means proportionality prin-
ciples, specifying that the chosen means must not be overbroad
or unnecessary in light of available less intrusive measures,
have been applied to capital punishment; bail; punitive dam-
ages; forced medication; police investigatory powers; and in
First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Fourteenth Amend-
ment Section 5 cases. At least two of these principles-limiting
retributivism and ends proportionality-seem implicit in case
law interpreting the proportionate penalties clause of the Illi-
nois state constitution. 234
The many examples of ends and means proportionality lim-
its show that, contrary to the views expressed by Justice Scalia
in Ewing, proportionality principles can be and often have been
meaningfully applied to government measures supported by
utilitarian goals. Justice Scalia himself has often expressly or
implicitly supported the application of one or both of these
utilitarian proportionality principles, particularly in cases lim-
iting Fourth Amendment rights and exclusionary remedies. 235
Justice Thomas, who also rejected any proportionality review in
Ewing, wrote the Court's opinion in Bajakajian, seeming to en-
234. See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (using reasonableness
balancing to uphold police roadblock); Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489
U.S. 538 (1989) (holding no right to jury trial for petty offense); Boos v. Berry,
485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding that statute regulating sidewalk protesters was
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest); Murray v. United
States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1987) (applying independent source exception to
Exclusionary Rule, balancing deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations
against loss of probative evidence).
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dorse retributive and perhaps also utilitarian proportionality
review of in personam criminal forfeitures. 236
IV. EXAMPLES OF PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Each of the three proportionality principles identified in
this Article enjoys widespread support in foreign and interna-
tional laws. Although U.S. constitutional requirements must be
defined in terms of American legal, political, cultural, and his-
torical traditions, the Supreme Court has occasionally found
additional support for its decisions in the laws of other nations
and under the terms of international human rights conven-
tions. 237 The following is a brief sampling of foreign and inter-
national law proportionality requirements.
A. SENTENCING
Recent comparative sentencing scholarship reveals broad
support for retributive and means proportionality principles.
There is general agreement across Western nations not only on
the definition of various crime-control punishment purposes
and on the most important aggravating and mitigating culpa-
bility and harm factors, but also on the overarching importance
of the principles of proportionality and parsimony.238 Propor-
236. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (noting that case fac-
tors cited by Justice Thomas correspond to traditional elements of retributive
proportionality; also suggesting that utilitarian proportionality assessments
are also implicitly endorsed, since the Court views forfeitures as serving deter-
rent as well as retributive purposes). Justice Thomas has also supported other
decisions implicitly applying utilitarian proportionality principles. See, e.g.,
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419.
237. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (noting that
under English law since 1967, and under a 1981 decision of the European
Court of Human Rights, private consensual homosexual conduct may not be
criminally punished); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988)
(noting that offenders less than sixteen years old at the time of the offense
cannot be executed in many foreign nations, both within and outside of the
Anglo-American sphere, and under three international human rights treaties);
id. at 830 n.31 (citing three earlier cases in which the Court recognized the
relevance of international perspectives, when deciding what penalties should
be deemed cruel and unusual).
238. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Perspectives on Sentencing Policy and
Research, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 259, 277-
79 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001). Proportionality and parsi-
mony principles seem to be given particularly great weight in Australia and
Minnesota. See Arie Freiberg, Three Strikes and You're Out-It's Not Cricket:
Colonization and Resistance in Australian Sentencing, in SENTENCING AND
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tionality appears to be defined in terms more consistent with
limiting than defining retributivism-there is much greater
emphasis on avoiding disproportionately severe sentences than
unduly lenient ones, and courts are granted considerable flexi-
bility in mitigating penalties and choosing among sanction
types of roughly equal severity. As was noted previously, 239 the
principle of parsimony-a preference for the least severe sanc-
tion which will adequately serve all applicable crime control
punishment purposes-is a form of means proportionality.
Some excellent examples of constitutional sentencing pro-
portionality requirements can be found in high court decisions
from other common law countries. For instance, the Canadian
Supreme Court has held that the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms requires government intrusions to minimize im-
pairment of protected rights (a form of means proportionality),
and also explicitly requires a form of ends proportionality,
weighing the competing values (e.g., burdens on free speech
rights versus the goal of combating racial hatred).240 Applying
these general proportionality requirements in Smith v. The
Queen, the court held that a mandatory seven-year-minimum
sentence for importing narcotics violated the Charter. 24 1 In
reaching this conclusion, the court also appeared to apply limit-
ing retributive as well as utilitarian ends and means propor-
tionality standards.
Section 12 of the Charter bans "cruel and unusual treat-
ment or punishment."242 The court appeared to assume that
SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, supra at 29, 38-39; Frase, Sentencing
Principles, supra note 104, at 364. Sentencing proportionality is also explicitly
recognized in international criminal prosecutions. See Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 81(2)(a), at 54, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.183/9 (1998) (granting defense and prosecution rights to appeal the
sentence on grounds that it is disproportionate to the crime); see also id., art.
78(1), at 53 ("[The trial court shall] take into account such factors as the grav-
ity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.").
National courts and the European Court of Human Rights have also barred
extradition of offenders on the grounds that the punishment they would re-
ceive in the demanding state would be disproportionate. See NORA V.
DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND
GUIDELINES 506 (2004).
239. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
240. Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitu-
tionalism: Opening up the Conversation on "Proportionality," Rights and Fed-
eralism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 604-16 (1999).
241. 40 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (1987).
242. CAN. CONST. (Constitutional Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 12.
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section 12 imposes a retributive standard, 243 and held the
mandatory minimum penalty invalid, reasoning that since that
penalty applied regardless of the drug type or quantity and the
offender's purposes or other characteristics, "it is inevitable
that, in some cases, a verdict of guilt will lead to the imposition
of a term of imprisonment which will be grossly disproportion-
ate" to what the offender deserves.244 However, that finding
was only the first step in the proportionality analysis. Section 1
of the Charter provides that charter rights may be subject to
such "reasonable limits... as can be demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society."245 The Smith court found that
deterring drug importation was a goal of sufficient importance
to warrant overriding the retributive limits of section 12, essen-
tially using an ends proportionality test. 246 But the court fur-
ther held that the means chosen to pursue this goal were dis-
proportionate. Section 1 requires that, to override charter
rights, the means chosen should impair those rights as little as
possible. 247 The court in Smith held that the mandatory mini-
mum statute in question failed this minimum impairment re-
quirement, stating "[wie do not need to sentence the small of-
fenders to seven years in prison in order to deter the serious
offender."248
Other examples of the application of multiple, independent
constitutional sentencing proportionality standards can be
found in foreign cases involving dangerous offenders. High
Courts in Canada, England, and South Africa have upheld
lengthy indeterminate prison terms imposed on such offenders,
provided that the conviction offense is very serious (retributive
and/or ends proportionality), and provided further that there
are provisions for periodic review of the offender's dangerous-
ness, so that his detention continues no longer than is neces-
sary to protect the public (means proportionality).249
243. Smith, 40 D.L.R. (4th) at 477.
244. Id. at 481.
245. CAN. CONST. (Constitutional Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 1.
246. Smith, 40 D.L.R. (4th) at 483. The Court also stated in dicta that
"there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are
responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which
has been identified as of 'sufficient importance' [to overcome the charter right
or freedom]." Id. at 483.
247. Id. at 482-83.
248. Id. at 483.
249. See Smit & Ashworth, supra note 108, at 550-52. This means propor-
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B. OTHER FOREIGN LAWS
Proportionality principles are well established in the do-
mestic legal systems of several foreign countries. 250 Perhaps the
most well-developed jurisprudence is found in Germany, where
three distinct proportionality principles are recognized in ad-
ministrative and constitutional law: (1) the principle of suitabil-
ity (public authorities must use means appropriate to the ends
they hope to achieve); (2) the principle of necessity (authorities
must choose the least harmful, restrictive, or burdensome
means available to achieve their ends); and (3) the principle of
proportionality in the strict sense (the injury, costs, or burdens
of the chosen means must be less than the benefits sought to be
gained).25 1 The second and third of these principles are clearly
recognizable as means and ends proportionality. The first prin-
ciple is perhaps comparable to the American "rational basis"
test,252 and some writers have argued that it is not really a
form of proportionality at all.25 3
Proportionality principles are important not only in Ger-
man administrative and constitutional law and in sentencing,
as discussed above, but also in criminal procedure rules. For
example, custodial arrest and pretrial detention are limited by
an ends proportionality test; these measures are not permitted
if they would be disproportionate to the severity of the offense
and the expected penalty.254 Ends proportionality principles are
tionality requirement also provides a strong argument against any sentence of
life without possibility of parole. See infra notes 300-01 and accompanying
text.
250. See, e.g., NICHOLAS EMILIou, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN
EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1-3, 23-114 (1996); JURGEN
SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 680-702 (1992); Jackson, supra
note 240, at 604-16; E. Thomas Sullivan, Antitrust Remedies in the U.S. and
EU: Advancing a Standard of Proportionality, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 377, 415-
18 (2003); Zoller, supra note 231, at 568-69.
251. EMILIOU, supra note 250, at 23-66, 268; SCHWARZE, supra note 250,
at 685-92; Sullivan, supra note 250, at 415-17; Zoller, supra note 231, at 581-
83.
252. Sullivan, supra note 250, at 417.
253. EMILIOU, supra note 250, at 25-26. However, actions which fail this
test can be seen as excessive, and therefore disproportionate, in the sense that
they impose totally useless costs or burdens.
254. Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Justice as a
Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions? 18 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 326-28 (1995). A means proportionality test is also
implicit in German arrest and detention law-custody is not permitted unless
it is necessary to identify the suspect, prevent flight, or prevent further crime.
Id. at 326. Similar necessity requirements apply to pretrial detention in the
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also implicit in the standards used to determine whether ille-
gally seized evidence can be used at trial. German courts bal-
ance the competing interests by weighing the seriousness of the
offense, the need for the evidence to support a conviction, and
the seriousness of the illegality which led to the evidence. 255
Both ends and means proportionality rules can be found in
the laws of many other countries, including Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, France, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, South Africa, and Spain.256
C. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
European Community law now appears to incorporate all
three of the German proportionality principles described
above,257 and these principles are also recognized and applied
by the European Court of Human Rights. 258 The laws of war, as
reflected in the Hague and Geneva Conventions (and before
that, religious writings and canon law) also incorporate both
ends and means proportionality limitations. 259 Military actions
must seek to minimize unnecessary suffering (means propor-
tionality), and must not be excessive relative to the military
advantage (ends proportionality) sought to be achieved. 260
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
OF PRISON TERMS
The previous discussion has shown that there are three
well-established proportionality principles recognized in Ameri-
United States, see id. at 327, but not to the arrest decision. Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 318 (2001).
255. Frase & Weigend, supra note 254, at 336.
256. See sources cited supra note 250.
257. EMILIOU, supra note 250, at 115-274; SCHWARZE, supra note 250, at
677-79, 708-866; Sullivan, supra note 250, at 414-18; Zoller, supra note 231,
at 569, 584-85.
258. SCHWARZE, supra note 250, at 704-07; Zoller, supra note 231, at 569.
259. SCHWARZE, supra note 250, at 703-04; Sullivan, supra note 250, at
415 n.246.
260. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, art. 8(2)(a)(iv), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (defining war crimes to
include "[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly"); id., art.
8(2)(b)(iv) (prohibiting "[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge
that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or dam-
age to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the con-
crete and direct overall military advantage anticipated").
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can, foreign, and international law. Each of these principles is
independent of the others, because each is supported by impor-
tant core values. Retributive proportionality limits reflect fun-
damental human rights concerns about fairness and abuse of
governmental power.26 1 Although the Supreme Court has
seemed to reject any independent constitutional role for re-
tributive values in limiting the duration of prison sentences,
such values play significant roles in regulating capital punish-
ment, fines and forfeitures, and punitive damages awards;
there is no good reason why prison terms should not also be
subject to meaningful retributive limits. 262
The utilitarian "ends" proportionality principle-that costs
and burdens of government measures should not outweigh the
benefits-has been explicitly or implicitly recognized in a wide
variety of contexts, and has been used to protect individual
rights, limit certain rights and remedies, and protect states'
rights against congressional overreaching. Utilitarian "means"
proportionality's preference for equally effective but less costly
or burdensome measures, is likewise a well-established princi-
ple recognized in many areas of American constitutional, for-
eign, and international laws. Whenever government measures
interfere with fundamental liberties it is especially important
that such measures be scrutinized for excessiveness relative to
the ends being pursued and the available alternative means for
achieving those ends. Granted, the degree of scrutiny as to both
ends and means proportionality depends on the importance of
the government's purposes and the competing liberties at
stake. In the context of prison sentencing, there are very impor-
tant public safety goals supporting such sentences. But as will
be discussed more fully in the concluding section of this Article,
lengthy prison terms seriously threaten defendants' vital inter-
ests in physical liberty, social status, privacy, dignity, health,
and safety. The supervisory role of courts is limited by the val-
ues underlying our federal system, and by the assumed greater
democratic legitimacy of legislative policymaking. But federal-
ism and separation of powers concerns have not prevented
261. NORVAL MORRIS & COLIN HOWARD, STUDIES IN CRIMINAL LAW 147-96
(1964); Frase, supra note 238, at 279-81; Frase, Limiting Retributivism, supra
note 104, at 92-93; Smit & Ashworth, supra note 108, at 542-44.
262. Cf. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983) ("It would be anomalous
indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punish-
ment of imprisonment were not.").
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courts from imposing constitutional proportionality limits in
many other areas of law.
A clearer understanding of the three proportionality prin-
ciples identified in this Article can help to make sense of the
Court's current approach to claims of excessiveness in prison
sentencing. A majority of the Justices are willing to impose at
least narrow ("gross disproportionality") limits on such sen-
tences, but the Court has also said that states are free to pur-
sue a variety of sentencing purposes. The independent utilitar-
ian ends- and means-proportionality principles can be used to
evaluate excessiveness relative to nonretributive sentencing
goals. Retributive proportionality is obviously especially rele-
vant when states assert retributive sentencing goals, but as
suggested above it is arguable that some degree of retributive
proportionality should be an independent constitutional re-
quirement, limiting the duration of prison terms imposed to
achieve utilitarian sentencing goals. Again, retributive propor-
tionality limits have been applied to several other forms of pun-
ishment, including the death penalty, fines and forfeitures, and
punitive damages. 263
One interpretation of the Court's most recent holdings is
that a sentence only violates the Eighth Amendment if it is
grossly disproportionate in relation to all traditional sentencing
purposes, or at least all purposes asserted by the State. Even
under this narrow interpretation, the two utilitarian propor-
tionality principles identified in this Article should still apply
disjunctively because each represents a distinct and important
form of excessiveness; a sentence supported by utilitarian pur-
poses should be held unconstitutional if it grossly violates ends
proportionality (because the sentence's burdens greatly exceed
the likely crime-control benefits) or if it grossly violates means
proportionality (because a much less severe sentence would be
adequate to achieve the State's asserted crime-control pur-
poses). The better approach, however, would apply all three
proportionality principles disjunctively; a gross violation of any
one of them should be sufficient grounds to find an Eighth
Amendment violation. Again, the three proportionality princi-
ples are logically independent and operate independently in
other areas of constitutional law.
But how should courts integrate these proportionality
principles into existing or alternative approaches to Eighth
263. See supra notes 132-46, 160-78 and accompanying text.
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Amendment jurisprudence? Assuming that the Supreme Court
and courts interpreting state constitutions will retain the cur-
rent SolemlHarmelinlEwing standards, the three independent
proportionality principles could be applied: (1) to the "thresh-
old" assessment of the first Solem factor, as outlined in Justice
Kennedy's Harmelin concurrence; (2) to all three Solem factors;
and/or (3) to the ultimate requirement of "gross disproportion-
ality."
Applying independent retributive, ends, and means propor-
tionality requirements to the threshold determination would
address a major problem with Justice Kennedy's approach. Jus-
tice Kennedy puts greatest emphasis on the first Solem factor
(comparison of the gravity of the offense with the severity of the
sentence), yet that factor is the least objective of the three. 264
Applying the three proportionality principles at the first step of
the Solem analysis would help to make these determinations
more objective. If the three principles were given independent
force, more cases would support a "threshold" inference of gross
disproportionality, thereby justifying resort to more objective
intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparative analyses. As Justice
Breyer noted in his dissent in Ewing, there is no point in hav-
ing a "threshold" test if its standards are just as strict as the
ultimate test; "[a] threshold test must permit arguably uncon-
stitutional sentences, not only actually unconstitutional sen-
tences, to pass the threshold."265 Although it might seem
unlikely that the current Court would adopt a rule with a po-
tential to increase Eighth Amendment limits on prison terms,
the Court has occasionally adopted overbroad, "bright-line"
rules which provide greater guidance to decision makers,
and/or facilitate review of their decisions. 266 Finally, even if re-
tributive and utilitarian proportionality principles are applied
conjunctively in the manner suggested above (that is, both the
264. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 41-42 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1020 (1991) (White, J., dissenting); Van
Cleave, supra note 131, at 230. The third Solem factor is difficult to apply in
the absence of reliable and comparable data on sentences imposed and served
in other states, but such data is becoming more and more readily available,
particularly in states with sentencing guidelines commissions. See Richard S.
Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and the Federal
Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 69, 75 (1999).
265. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
266. See Frase, supra note 211, at 352-53 (noting that the Court's "bright-




retributive principle and one of the utilitarian principles would
have to be violated), in close cases courts should consider the
cumulative impact of these findings-a sentence that is argua-
bly "grossly disproportionate" both retributively and in one or
both utilitarian senses should justify finding at least a thresh-
old Eighth Amendment violation.
Applying the three proportionality principles to the second
and third Solem factors, or to the ultimate "gross dispropor-
tionality" test, is more problematic. Although intra- and inter-
jurisdictional comparisons have some relevance to each of the
proportionality principles, the connection in any given case is
unclear-each of those Solem factors is indicative of more than
one type of disproportionality. 267 And if the second and third
Solem factors are retained, as important indicators of "gross
disproportionality," then that ultimate standard will also not be
closely tied to any one proportionality principle.
Another way to incorporate retributive and utilitarian pro-
portionality principles into the assessment of whether criminal
penalties are constitutionally excessive under the
Solem/Harmelin/Ewing standards would be to recognize differ-
ent levels of scrutiny-analogous to those used in First
Amendment and Equal Protection jurisprudence-for different
categories of penalties. 268 The Supreme Court has hinted at
this approach by suggesting that "death is different" for Eighth
Amendment purposes. 269 Consistent with this assumption and
the proportionality principles identified in this Article, the
Court (or state courts) could divide penalties into two or three
major categories, for instance: (1) noncustodial and short to
medium-length custody terms; (2) lengthy custodial terms; and
(3) death sentences. The constitutional limits on the first cate-
gory, constituting the vast majority of sentences imposed,
would be something akin to rational basis analysis. For lengthy
custodial terms, the three proportionality principles would ap-
ply disjunctively to Justice Kennedy's "threshold" determina-
tion, as suggested above. Death sentences would face the strict-
est limits, being held unconstitutional if they violate any of the
267. See discussion supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
268. Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: California's
Three Strikes Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483, 523 n.89 (2002); see also Radin,
supra note 14, at 1009-30, 1062-67.
269. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (opinion of Justice Scalia); Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
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three proportionality principles, and with limited need to con-
sider intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons. 270
One problem with this approach is the difficulty of defining
the boundaries of the penalty categories-when is a custodial
sentence "lengthy" enough to justify heightened, but not the
highest, scrutiny? It may help to recognize that the federal and
state constitutional standards need not be identical. For federal
purposes, it may be that only prison sentences of life without
parole-formally or de facto (where the defendant will probably
die in prison)27 1-would qualify for the second category. Under
state constitutions, however, courts would be free to draw the
lines more generously, including in the second category any
sentence which is likely to keep the offender in prison more
than some readily calculable number of years (for instance:
three times the average time served by offenders convicted of
that crime, or twice the ordinary maximum term for that of-
fense).
A different multitiered approach would be to apply height-
ened scrutiny, along the lines sketched above, whenever the
circumstances surrounding the penalty's enactment or imposi-
tion suggest a high risk of disproportionality. 272 Such circum-
stances might include severe penalties enacted in response to a
"moral panic" generated by one or more high profile cases,273
rapid escalation in penalties over a relatively short period of
time, 27 4 and indications of potential racial bias in the enact-
270. The Court's decisions invalidating death sentences usually consider
sentences for similar offenders in other states, but not sentences for different
offenses within the same state. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-
17 (2002); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1982). But see Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (comparing rape penalties in other states); id.
at 600 (comparing Georgia's penalties for rape and for deliberate killing with-
out aggravating circumstances).
271. These appear to have been the actual facts in both Ewing and
Andrade. See supra notes 77, 93 and accompanying text.
272. For similar proposals see Pillsbury, supra note 268, at 523 n.89, and
King, supra note 13, at 187-89.
273. MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 85-96 (2004) (discussing the concept of moral
panic and citing examples); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minne-
sota, 1978-2003, 32 CRIME & JUST.: REV. RES. 131, 137, 159-64 (2005) (dis-
cussing several instances where severe penalties were hastily enacted in re-
sponse to one or several high profile cases).
274. For example, one might question the proportionality of some of Min-
nesota's current and proposed sex crime penalties. From 1980 until 1989, the
presumptive sentence for first degree criminal sexual conduct by an offender
with no prior record was 43 months; in 1989 the penalty was raised to 86
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ment of the penalty or handling of the case. 275 This approach
could also be combined with the penalty-category approach, al-
lowing the cumulative effects of relatively severe penalties and
circumstances suggesting high risk of disproportionality to in-
voke heightened scrutiny where neither of these factors alone
would suffice. Each of these approaches or a combined ap-
proach could also incorporate different allocations of the burden
of proof-ordinarily on defendants, but shifting to the state at
some higher levels(s) of scrutiny.276
For present purposes, I will assume that courts will-and
should-take the following simpler approach: (1) apply the
three proportionality principles independently to Justice Ken-
nedy's "threshold" determination; (2) if the penalty appears
"grossly disproportionate" relative to any of the three propor-
tionality principles, then make intra- and inter-state277 com-
parisons under the second and third Solem factors; and (3) find
an Eighth Amendment violation if either 278 of those compari-
months; it was further raised to 144 months in 2000, and proposals were made
in the 2004 legislative session to subject some or all of these offenders to life in
prison, or even life without parole. See Frase, supra note 273.
275. For example, the defendant in Hutto v. Davis may have received his
severe sentence at least in part because he was an African American man in a
rural Virginia community who had dared to date white women and marry one.
See Grossman, supra note 13, at 120 n.80. It might be possible to view sen-
tencing proportionality standards as a way to "flush out" illicit government
motives, which some view as the function of strict scrutiny analysis, see supra
note 148, but it is not clear what those motives might be other than racism. Cf.
Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 560-63 (2004) (arguing that punishment is unconstitu-
tional if motivated by malice or a desire to demean).
276. Various burden of proof allocations are discussed in King, supra note
13, at 187; Radin, supra note 14, at 1009-30, 1049, 1054-55, 1062; Singer, su-
pra note 99, at 72; and Spece, supra note 121, at 1056-58. Standards could
also address the degree of certainty demonstrated or required, regarding the
ends likely to be achieved by the sentence and/or the relative effectiveness of
proposed and alternative means. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a)(ii) (Pre-
liminary Draft No. 3, 2004) (stating that crime control and restorative justice
goals may be pursued "when possible with realistic prospect of success" (and
within retributive upper and lower limits)).
277. Some have argued that external comparisons under the third Solem
factor should include sentencing in other nations, not just in other states. Smit
& Ashworth, supra note 108, at 555. In several cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
has been willing to make international sentencing and criminalization com-
parisons. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
278. Sometimes only intra-state comparisons will suggest disproportional-
ity (e.g., a recidivist law which imposes more severe penalties on minor prop-
erty offenders than many murderers receive in that state, but whose penalties
are not much more severe than those imposed in a number of other states). In
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sons corroborates the threshold inference of "gross dispropor-
tionality." The latter standard is admittedly vague, but the
Court continues to apply it not only to prison terms, but also to
death sentences, punitive damages, and fines and forfeitures.
The remainder of this Article will use the facts of the
Court's six modern prison-duration cases to illustrate how
these cases should be analyzed under the approach summa-
rized above. I will argue that, with a better understanding of
proportionality principles, Solem would still be decided the
same way, but several of the other cases might have been de-
cided in favor of the defendant, and should be so decided under
state constitutional counterparts of the Eighth Amendment.
A. RUMMEL V. ESTELLE
Rummel v. Estelle is not an easy case even under a more
precise and generous set of proportionality principles. 279 On the
one hand, the very minor nature of Rummel's conviction offense
(obtaining $121 by false pretenses, in failing to perform a con-
tract) provides a strong basis to find both retributive and ends
disproportionality. His limited blameworthiness for this offense
hardly seems to justify a life sentence, and the burden such a
sentence imposes on the offender may greatly outweigh any
crime-control or other social benefits likely to be achieved. 280
Even if one were to count Rummel's two prior crimes, including
fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or
services and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, as
part of his "deserts" and the utility calculus, his case seems far
from grave.
On the other hand, Rummel does seem likely to commit
further property crimes, which arguably increases his deserved
punishment at least somewhat,281 and certainly increases the
social harm to be assessed under ends proportionality. In sev-
other cases, the sentence will only appear disproportionate in light of inter-
state comparisons (e.g., a state with extremely severe penalties for most
crimes). Either scenario may violate retributive and/or utilitarian ends or
means proportionality limits.
279. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). For a summary of the facts and opinions in
Rummel, see supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
280. In computing the likely crime-control benefits one must deduct any
negative consequences of disproportionate penalties, such as distorted societal
norms and reverse deterrence. See discussion supra notes 114-15 and accom-
panying text.
281. See infra note 285 and accompanying text for a discussion of differing
views of the retributive significance of a defendant's prior record.
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eral cases the Court has stated that a defendant may only be
punished for the current offense, which is deemed to be "aggra-
vated" by his recidivism. 28 2 This focus on the current offense is
necessary to avoid claims that recidivist penalties constitute
double jeopardy. However, the application of this theory was
severely strained by the Court's decision in Ewing, upholding a
twenty-five-to-life sentence imposed on a recidivist charged
with stealing three golf clubs; it is difficult to avoid the conclu-
sion that Ewing was, in fact, being punished again for his prior
crimes. 28 3 Thus, the Court may be forced to reconsider the
heavy weight it has allowed states to give to prior record. Ap-
plying an independent, limiting retributive proportionality
standard, as this Article has proposed, would limit the weight
accorded to prior crimes, and avoid double jeopardy problems.
Another serious difficulty in assessing the proportionality
of Rummel's sentence is that the Court assumed he would be-
come eligible for parole in ten to twelve years; a sentence of
that length is hardly unusual, at least in the American context.
But since parole is discretionary, Rummel might very well end
up serving substantially more than twelve years. Must the de-
fendant have already served an excessive sentence before he
can challenge it? One solution to this problem would be to re-
quire the state to compute an expected release date based on
past practices for similar offenders, with a further requirement
of administrative due process (hearing, statement of reasons) if
that release date is later postponed. A reviewing court could
then use the expected release date to assess proportionality on
the "front end."
Suppose, in Rummel's case, that his expected time to serve
is fifteen years. Such a sentence still seems "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to his minor conviction offense, under the retributive
and ends proportionality criteria discussed above. There re-
282. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 402-03 (1995) (quoting Gryger v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 n.21 (1983)
("[The recidivist] already has paid the penalty for each of his prior offenses.");
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (stating that the defendant's prior
violent crimes, including murder, "do not change the fact that the instant
crime [did not involve] the taking of life"); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616, 623 (1912) (stating that recidivists "are not punished the second time for
the earlier offense, but the repetition of criminal conduct aggravates their
guilt and justifies heavier penalties when they are again convicted"); Moore v.
Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895) (same).
283. Nathan H. Seltzer, Note, When the Tail Wags the Dog: The Collision
Course Between Recidivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 B.U.
L. REV. 921, 936-37 (2003).
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mains the question of how much weight to give Rummel's two
prior crimes, in setting the retributive and utilitarian upper
limits on his third sentence. The future harms "saved" by lock-
ing up such a repeat offender are uncertain, but may be suffi-
ciently plausible to avoid a threshold finding of gross ends dis-
proportionality. Given our present state of knowledge, it would
be even more difficult to base such a finding on means propor-
tionality (that a sentence of less than fifteen years would ade-
quately serve the state's deterrent and incapacitative goals).28 4
Threshold gross disproportionality might be shown on re-
tributive grounds, depending on how much Rummel's "de-
served" punishment is deemed to increase, in light of his prior
crimes. Retributive scholars differ greatly on this point; some
would give prior record no weight, while others would permit
modest penalty increases for recidivists. 28 5 This lack of theo-
retical clarity and consensus is perhaps the most important
reason why the Court has declined to give retributive values
significant independent weight in assessing prison terms for
recidivists under the Eighth Amendment. Capital punishment
cases have been the exception; the Court appears to have been
willing to apply significant retributive limits even to habitual
offenders. 28 6 The Ewing decision suggests that in prison dura-
tion cases the majority of Justices view prior crimes as relevant
to both the threshold and the ultimate disproportionality is-
sues. It is possible that more precise analysis of the independ-
ent retributive and utilitarian meanings of proportionality, as
discussed here, would persuade at least one Justice in Ewing to
reconsider and apply the conviction-offense-based retributive
standards used in the death penalty cases. If not, the imposi-
tion of Eighth Amendment retributive limits on recidivist en-
hancements will have to await further elaboration and broader
consensus in the philosophy of punishment.
Even in the absence of such developments, however, courts
interpreting state constitutions are free to take a different ap-
284. See ZIMRING ETAL., supra note 99, at 190-91.
285. Compare ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST AND FUTURE CRIMES:
DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 88-
91 (1985) (arguing that repeat offenders deserve somewhat greater punish-
ment), with GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 460-66 (1978)
(questioning whether a prior record increases an offender's culpability to any
degree). See generally Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the
Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUST.: REV. RES. 303, 317-19 (1997).
286. For example, the defendant in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 584, had
an extensive and very violent prior record.
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proach. For example, they might discard the separate "thresh-
old" question entirely, and examine Solem factors two and
three in every case. Or they might ignore prior crimes for pur-
poses of deciding whether threshold retributive disproportional-
ity has been shown, or place much stricter retributive limits on
the weight given to prior record in the threshold determination
(for instance, holding that all recidivist enhancements more
than two or three times the maximum term for a first offender
raise an inference of gross disproportionality). Any of these ap-
proaches would have the advantage of reducing emphasis on
the problematic first Solem prong, with its difficult line-
drawing problems, and allowing more cases to be decided under
the more objective comparative analysis called for by the sec-
ond and third Solem factors.
But even these more generous approaches might not pro-
duce a ruling in Rummel's favor if, as was hypothesized above,
his expected sentence is only fifteen years. He would fare poorly
under the second Solem factor in any state imposing lengthy
prison terms for most crimes. As for the third factor, a fifteen-
year sentence might not appear grossly excessive, given the
large number of states with three strikes and other severe ha-
bitual offender penalties.
B. HuTTO v. DAVIs
As in Rummel, Hutto v. Davis28 7 involved a relatively mi-
nor current offense and a lengthy prison term subject to uncer-
tain parole. Davis's current offenses-sale of three ounces of
marijuana to a furloughed inmate, plus possession of six more
ounces, two drug scales, and other paraphernalia-are argua-
bly more serious. 28 8 His maximum sentence of forty years is
probably less severe than Rummel's life sentence, but we do not
know when Davis would have become eligible for parole, or how
soon after that he was likely to be released. His prior offense of
selling LSD was more serious, and he committed the current
offenses while released on appeal of the prior conviction. How-
ever, a more retributive, offense-based approach, that excluded
his prior record or gave it very limited weight, might still find
Davis's sentence grossly disproportionate to possession and sale
287. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam). For a summary of the facts and
opinions in Hutto, see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
288. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 376-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
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of less than nine ounces of marijuana, 28 9 thus passing the
threshold test under Harmelin and Ewing. A further argument
in favor of finding Davis's sentence presumptively dispropor-
tionate could be based on the Virginia legislature's decision, a
few years later, to reduce the maximum penalty for his crime to
twenty years. 290 This action suggests that the Legislature
would view a forty-year sentence as clearly violating one or
more of the proportionality principles-as exceeding desert; as
imposing sentence burdens which outweigh the benefits; and/or
as more severe than necessary to adequately control this type
of criminal behavior. Another factor which might raise a
"threshold" inference of gross disproportionality is the role
which race may have played in producing Davis's severe sen-
tence.291 If Davis could get past the threshold determination he
might have a strong claim based on an intrajurisdictional com-
parison (Solem step two). Although there is no published data
on contemporary penalties given for other crimes in Davis's
state, a lower court had found that in a recent one-year period
the average Virginia prison sentence for the same crime of sell-
ing marijuana, was a little over three years, and no defendant
had received a sentence of over fifteen years. 292
C. SOLEM V. HELM
The three-pronged proportionality test announced in Solem
v. Helm293 has been modified by later cases. Justice Kennedy's
Harmelin concurrence dispenses with the second and third
Solem -prongs except in "rare" cases, and Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Ewing argues that an offender's prior record is part
of the critical "threshold" proportionality assessment under the
first Solem prong. Do these later modifications mean that even
289. In Minnesota, as of 2004, Davis's conviction offense would be a fifth
degree drug crime with a five-year-maximum sentence and a recommended
sentence of probation (which can include up to one year in a local jail). See
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON
DRUG OFFENDER SENTENCING ISSUES 44-46 (2004), http://www.msgc.state.
mn.us/reports tothelegislature.htm. Drug penalties have become much
harsher in many states since 1982, and Minnesota's current penalties are par-
ticularly harsh. Id. at 48-54.
290. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
291. See supra note 275.
292. The Supreme Court and lower court opinions in Davis did not contain
any interjurisdictional comparative data.
293. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). For a summary of the facts and opinions in
Solem, see supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
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Helm's sentence would no longer be found unconstitutional?
The Supreme Court is, of course, reluctant to overrule prior de-
cisions, and the Court can also claim (notwithstanding its deci-
sion in Harmelin) that life without parole is "objectively" much
more severe than any lesser prison term. But the three inde-
pendent proportionality principles identified in this Article also
provide a strong basis to affirm the result in Solem. Helm's ex-
tremely severe sentence is very disproportionate to his culpabil-
ity as measured by his conviction offense (passing a $100 bad
check) or even his entire criminal record-all of his crimes were
minor, nonviolent offenses, with alcohol a contributing factor in
each case. Given the minor nature of his past and probable fu-
ture crimes, life without parole also seems likely to be far more
costly in human terms than the crimes it will prevent through
deterrence and incapacitation (discounted by the risk of en-
couraging more serious crimes (reverse deterrence), and the
long term disutility of disproportionate penalties).294 And since
alcohol appears to be a major cause of Helm's criminality,
treatment of that problem seems a much less onerous and more
effective response (means proportionality). To the extent that
this recidivist statute is based on the goal of incapacitating
dangerous offenders, the absence of any parole release option
under this recidivist statute also violates means proportional-
ity-it is virtually certain that some recidivists sentenced un-
der this law will cease to be dangerous at some point before
they die.295 Thus, all three proportionality standards, both in-
dependently and collectively, establish a strong inference of
gross disproportionality, thereby requiring intra- and inter-
jurisdictional comparisons. For the reasons stated in Justice
Powell's majority opinion in Solem, such comparisons amply
confirm the threshold finding of gross disproportionality, and
require a ruling in Helm's favor.
294. See further discussion supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
Even without these discounts there is good reason to doubt the deterrent and
incapacitative effects of longer prison terms. See Andrew Ashworth, Criminal
Justice Reform: Principles, Human Rights and Public Protection, 2004 CRIM.
L. REV. 516, 519-21. See generally HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1982).
295. Similar means proportionality arguments, emphasizing the impor-
tance of periodic reviews of the offender's continuing dangerousness, have
been accepted by courts in Canada, England and Wales, and South Africa. See
supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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D. HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
Harmelin v. Michigan296 is the only one of the six modern
Supreme Court prison-duration cases that involved a first of-
fender, so retributive and utilitarian offense-based proportion-
ality issues are central. Although the 672 ounces of cocaine in-
volved was a large amount, the defendant was charged only
with possession, not sale or intent to sell. As the dissent
pointed out, 297 Harmelin's life-without-parole sentence treated
him the same as if he had been charged and convicted of sale or
intent to sell.298 Moreover, it would not be proper for a sentenc-
ing court to infer intent to sell from the large quantity of drugs;
subsequent Supreme Court cases have held that contested sen-
tencing factors which raise the maximum authorized penalty
must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 299
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion appeared to evade
these retributive and legal process issues by focusing on the se-
rious social harms associated with such a large quantity of co-
caine. Implicitly, Justice Kennedy was arguing that Harmelin's
sentence was consistent with one element of retributive propor-
tionality (harm) and with ends proportionality-severe social
harms justify severe penalties. As was previously noted, how-
ever, severe penalties can also cause reverse deterrence if of-
fenders, expecting no great difference in penalty, become more
likely to sell, not just possess, or are even tempted to kill wit-
nesses or arresting officers to avoid detection or capture. In any
case, satisfying only one of the three proportionality standards
should not suffice; the three standards are independent, and re-
flect different values. It is plausible to argue that Harmelin's
sentence was excessive relative to his culpability, especially
when compared to the greater culpability of offenders who are
proven to have sold or intended to sell, yet receive penalties no
more severe. This argument should be sufficient to establish
threshold disproportionality, which would then be strongly
296. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). For a summary of the facts and opinions in Har-
melin, see supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
297. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1025 (White, J., dissenting).
298. This argument was accepted by the state supreme court, which subse-
quently struck down this drug statute under the Michigan Constitution. Peo-
ple v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 877 (Mich. 1992).
299. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004); Ring v. Arizona,




supported by intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis. Inter-
jurisdictional comparison also supports an argument based on
means disproportionality-the much lower sentences imposed
in almost all other jurisdictions imply that a less severe penalty
would achieve just as good results.
The defendant in Harmelin also contested the mandatory
nature of his penalty. This argument was summarily rejected
by Justice Scalia, joined on this point by four other Justices.
Scalia pointed to the long history of mandatory penalties in the
United States, and distinguished the individualization required
to impose capital punishment because death is different. But
unlike Justice Scalia, the other four Justices who approved of
Michigan's mandatory penalty all accept Eighth Amendment
proportionality limits; 300 one or more of these Justices might be
persuaded to take another look at the problems posed by the in-
teraction between severity and lack of case-specific sentencing
discretion. A strong case can be made that severe mandatory
penalties, particularly those which apply to a large number of
offenders, are inherently excessive relative to desert-it is quite
possible that many of these offenders deserve the mandatory
penalty, but it is very unlikely that every eligible offender
does.30 1 Similar inherent overbreadth arguments can be made
on utilitarian grounds, particularly with respect to means pro-
portionality-when a large group of offenders is subjected to a
severe mandatory penalty with no possibility of parole release,
it is almost certain that, at least in some of these cases, such a
penalty is unnecessary to achieve adequate deterrence, inca-
pacitation, and other valid utilitarian goals. 302
300. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Harmelin, but joined Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Ewing, accepting
narrow proportionality limits. See supra note 4. The three concurring Justices
in Harmelin, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, all accept such limits.
301. Desert overbreadth arguments led the Michigan Supreme Court to
invalidate several mandatory minimum penalties under the state constitution.
See Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 875-76 (mandatory life without parole); People v.
Laurentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827, 831 (Mich. 1972) (mandatory twenty-year mini-
mum sentence).
302. The Supreme Court of Canada used a means disproportionality argu-
ment to strike down a mandatory drug penalty, concluding that such a law
would inevitably impose unnecessarily excessive penalties on some offenders.
See supra notes 246-48 and accompanying text. In Harmelin, Justice Stevens
argued that a mandatory sentence of life without parole is irrational in conclu-
sively presuming that all offenders subject to the penalty are wholly incorrigi-
ble so that society's interests in deterrence and retribution outweigh any con-
siderations of rehabilitation. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1028 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 99, at 194-200 (arguing that
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E. EWING V. CALIFORNIA
Given his extensive prior record, Ewing's case30 3 is more
comparable to Rummel and Solem than to Harmelin. Ewing's
theft of three golf clubs worth about $400 each was more seri-
ous than either Rummel's or Helm's conviction offense, but a
strong argument can still be made that a sentence of twenty-
five-years-to-life is grossly disproportionate to Ewing's desert.
Such a severe sentence also raises ends proportionality ques-
tions.
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Ewing implicitly
addressed the ends proportionality issue, citing data purporting
to demonstrate the crime-control benefits of the three strikes
law. 304 Incapacitative effects were implied by data showing
high recidivism rates for convicted offenders, especially prop-
erty offenders, and by a study in which a sample of three-
strikes offenders were found to have an average of five prior
felony convictions, half including robbery or burglary, and
eighty-four percent including one or more violent crimes. 305 De-
terrent effects were implied by data showing that after the
three strikes law became effective fewer parolees were return-
ing to prison for the commission of new crimes, and more parol-
ees were leaving the state than were entering it.306 Of course,
incapacitative effects must be measured by future crimes pre-
vented, not prior convictions. As for deterrence, any changes in
parolee recidivism and rates of departure from the state are in-
conclusive; crime rates may have been falling for all offenders
during this period, including those not subject to the three
strikes law, and rates of departure from the state may have in-
creased generally. Scholars have subjected the California three
strikes law to more precise examination, and have concluded
that the law's crime-control benefits are quite modest. 307
three features of mandatory minimum statutes guarantee that these laws will
result in excessive punishment of many offenders-the overaggregation and
"worst-case" orientation inherent in picking a single penalty; the legislature's
disregard of the important difference between symbolic and actual sanctions;
and its inability to consider all offender- and case-specific mitigating factors).
303. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). For a summary of the facts
and opinions in Ewing, see supra notes 62-84 and accompanying text.
304. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25-28.
305. Id. at 26.
306. Id. at 27.
307. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., STILL STRIKING OUT: TEN YEARS OF
CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES 14 (2004); ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 99, at 85-
105; Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's
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Finally, Ewing's sentence may grossly exceed what is
needed to achieve the legislature's utilitarian goals, thus violat-
ing means proportionality requirements. As Justice Breyer ar-
gued in his dissent, there is no reason to believe that a more
narrowly tailored three strikes law requiring that the third
strike also be a "serious or violent" crime would be less effective
in preventing such crimes through deterrence and incapacita-
tion.
Again, to be consistent with the Court's rulings on other is-
sues of constitutional proportionality, the Court should treat
each of the three proportionality principles as independent lim-
its on prison duration, at least for purposes of the threshold
analysis required by Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin.
Once analysis proceeds to the second and third Solem factors,
Ewing's challenge might succeed, at least under somewhat
more generous standards of review appropriate to state consti-
tutional adjudication. 308 Although he had a very long and some-
times violent criminal history, the intra- and inter-
jurisdictional comparisons presented in Justice Breyer's dissent
suggest that Ewing's sentence "is virtually unique in its harsh-
ness for his offense of conviction, and by a considerable de-
gree."30 9 Justice O'Connor responded that such severe sen-
tences are no longer rare in California-other offenders have
received similarly disproportionate penalties under the three
strikes law.310 But those cases cannot serve to justify Ewing's
sentence. Otherwise, a state could avoid all proportionality
"Three Strikes and You're Out" Law, 11 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 65, 67 (1999)
("[Ciounties that vigorously and strictly enforce the Three Strikes law did not
experience a decline in any crime category relative to more lenient counties.");
Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Did "Three Strikes" Cause the Recent
Drop in California Crime? An Analysis of the California Attorney General's
Report, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 102 (1998) ("[T]here is no evidence that
Three Strikes played an important role in the drop in the crime rate.").
Broader studies of jurisdictions with and without three strikes laws have con-
cluded that these laws do not significantly reduce crime. Linda S. Beres &
Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three-Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender
Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103 (1998); Tomislav V.
Kovandzic et al., "Striking Out" As Crime Reduction Policy: The Impact of
'Three Strikes" Laws on Crime Rates in U. S. Cities, 21 JUST. Q. 207 (2004);
Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Leg-
islation: Prison Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y. REV. 75, 75 (1999).
308. See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
309. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 24 n.1.
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limitations on newly enacted penalties, no matter how severe,
so long as those penalties were not too infrequently applied.
F. LOCKYER V. ANDRADE
The Supreme Court did not directly address the Eighth
Amendment issue in Lockyer v. Andrade,3 11 so it is possible
that at least one of the Justices in the plurality would find a
violation, even under the strict Harmelin approach. Indeed, if
Andrade's fifty-years-to-life sentence for stealing nine video-
tapes worth $150 does not violate the Eighth Amendment, then
as argued in Justice Souter's dissent, disproportionality has no
meaning. 312 In any case, the Court should find a violation un-
der the approach suggested here, and a state court could do so
easily. Andrade had a strong basis to claim retributive and
utilitarian ends disproportionality, based on his trivial convic-
tion offenses which included two episodes of shoplifting, each
normally classified as misdemeanor theft.313 Even when
Andrade's substantial but nonviolent prior record is factored in,
it can be argued that the burdens of his de facto life-without-
parole sentence outweigh the crime-control benefits of deter-
rence and incapacitation (discounted by the potential for re-
verse deterrence, and the long-term disutility of offense dispro-
portionality).
Andrade's sentence also violates utilitarian means propor-
tionality. As argued in Justice Souter's dissent, 314 Andrade's
second twenty-five-year term is not justified by the State's as-
serted rationale of incapacitating dangerous defendants-he
did not become twice as dangerous when he stole a second time,
so doubling his sentence is irrational. Similarly, if the State
were also to claim that the three strikes law is justified by de-
terrence, Andrade's second shoplifting trip did not double the
need for deterrence of other shoplifters. Justice Souter was es-
sentially making a means proportionality argument-the State
cannot show why a single minimum twenty-five-year sentence,
or something much less than fifty years, would be inadequate
311. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). For a summary of the facts and opinions in
Andrade, see supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
312. Id. at 83.
313. The classification of such thefts as misdemeanors shows that the legis-
lature recognized the minor culpability and social harm associated with these
crimes. Erwin Chemerinsky, Cruel and Unusual: The Story of Leandro
Andrade, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 13 (2003).
314. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 79-83 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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to achieve the State's asserted crime-control purposes. A per-
suasive means proportionality argument can also be based on
Andrade's drug addiction, which apparently motivated all of his
crimes. He and similar offenders are not deterrable by more se-
vere penalties, 315 and treatment is likely to be a much less on-
erous and more effective means of achieving the State's crime-
prevention goals.
CONCLUSION
In Ewing, the recent California three strikes case, seven
Justices agreed that the Eighth Amendment sets proportional-
ity limits in noncapital cases. However, these Justices dis-
agreed on the application of the proportionality principle in Ew-
ing's case and did not clearly say what they meant by
proportionality or how it should apply to nonretributive sen-
tencing goals. As shown in this Article, both retributive propor-
tionality and two distinct requirements of utilitarian propor-
tionality are well established in other areas of American
constitutional law, and also in foreign and international law.
Applying these three principles to the assessment of prison
terms under the Eighth Amendment would make such assess-
ments more precise, and would make the Supreme Court's ju-
risprudence more consistent across fields of law.
The Court's decisions in Harmelin and Ewing might be
read as holding that a sentence only violates the Eighth
Amendment if it is grossly disproportionate in relation to all
sentencing purposes. Even under this interpretation, the utili-
tarian ends and means proportionality principles identified in
this Article should still apply disjunctively-only one of them
need be violated-because each represents a distinct and im-
portant form of utilitarian excess. The better approach would
be to apply all three proportionality principles disjunctively,
finding an Eighth Amendment violation if any one of the three
is violated. The three principles are logically independent, rep-
resent distinct values, and operate independently in many
other areas of constitutional law. Independent application of
the three proportionality principles is particularly appropriate
in making the "threshold" determination of gross dispropor-
315. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002) (mentally retarded
offenders are not deterred); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988)
(offenders younger than sixteen years old are not deterred). Andrade's addic-
tion also arguably reduces his culpability, even if it does not provide a com-
plete defense, thus strengthening his retributive disproportionality argument.
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tionality required under the Court's current Eighth Amend-
ment approach (comparing the gravity of the defendant's of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty, the first Solem factor).
Without further modification, the standards guiding this
threshold determination are extremely vague, and the lan-
guage and results in Harmelin and Ewing suggest that virtu-
ally no cases will survive that determination. Applying the
three proportionality principles would add greater precision
and some degree of objectivity to the threshold standard. Ap-
plying these principles independently would allow additional
cases to become eligible for intra- and inter-jurisdictional com-
parisons under the more objective second and third Solem fac-
tors.
It is particularly important to recognize retributive propor-
tionality limits316 on lengthy prison terms under the Eighth
Amendment. Punishment in excess of blameworthiness is fun-
damentally unfair and a violation of human rights.317 Limiting
retributivism is a sound jurisprudential principle which enjoys
widespread support, and the Supreme Court has used this
principle to place constitutional limits on the imposition of
capital punishment, fines and forfeitures, and punitive dam-
ages.318 As the latter examples show, even serious wrongdoers
are entitled to proportionate punishment. Prison terms may be
less severe and final than capital punishment, but they are of-
ten far more onerous for the individual than fines, forfeitures,
and punitive damages; there is no good reason to set retributive
upper limits on the latter, but not on lengthy prison terms.
Appellate courts and articles such as this one necessarily
deal in abstractions-legal principles, applied within and
across factual contexts. But it is important for courts and
scholars to keep in mind the human reality of the specific con-
text at issue-in this case, the reality of what a lengthy prison
term means for the offender and his family. Foremost, of course
is the loss of freedom 319-decades of a person's life, caged like
316. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (discussing the differ-
ence between limiting and defining retributivism).
317. See supra note 261.
318. See discussion supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
319. Spece, supra note 121, at 1067 ("The right to freedom from confine-
ment was and is one of the primary values sought to be protected by the Con-
stitution."); id. at 1072 (stating that freedom from confinement is the "elemen-
tal" liberty (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974) (Rehnquist,
J.))). Some have argued that measures of the quantum of freedom lost by a
prison term should also take account of the severity of prison conditions this
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an animal, usually the best years, and often most of the per-
son's remaining years. Long prison terms also impose extended
or even permanent loss of social status and employability; lost
privacy and dignity;320 substantial risk of serious physical in-
jury from more or less forcible rape, other assaults, HIV, and
other infections; 321 constant fear of these assaults and injuries;
and as the ultimate result, profound demoralization, dehu-
manization, and brutalization.322 Of course, the things that
criminals do to their victims, the harms they cause and the
fears they stir up, are also very serious. But as indicated by the
six modern cases in the Supreme Court, most Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality cases are not about violent offenders, or
even high-level drug dealers. They are mostly about repeat
property offenders, most of whom have serious drug or alcohol
dependencies and/or mental health problems-people who are
basically just a nuisance, who we wish would go away.
Violations of utilitarian proportionality also have impor-
tant constitutional implications whenever the accused citizen's
physical liberty, security, or other fundamental rights are
threatened. Utilitarian ends and means proportionality princi-
ples are well established in many areas of American constitu-
tional law. In sentencing, as in these other areas, government
measures may be found unconstitutional if they are excessively
intrusive relative to their supposed benefits, and/or if they are
much more intrusive than equally effective, alternative meas-
ures.
The Supreme Court is understandably reluctant to give
broad effect to any of these proportionality principles under the
Eighth Amendment, for reasons of federalism and democratic
legitimacy-state legislators, chief executives, prosecutors, and
offender is likely to face, and any physical or other vulnerabilities that would
make the prison sentence particularly severe for the offender. Smit &
Ashworth, supra note 108, at 548-49.
320. See Singer, supra note 99, at 87-88 (noting that prisons as of 1972 had
become more dangerous and more degrading than a century earlier); JAMES Q.
WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTS AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (noting that conditions and
treatment of inmates in U.S. prisons are much worse than in Western Euro-
pean prisons).
321. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS
(2001); Steve Lerner, Rule of the Cruel: How Violence is Built into America's
Prisons, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 15, 1984, at 17.
322. James E. Robertson, "Four Little Eighteenth-Century Words" An Inte-
grated Reading of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 37 CRIM. L.
BULL. 475, 483-85, 501-07 (2001).
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judges are more directly accountable to the public than are Su-
preme Court Justices. But sentencing is an area in which it is
particularly important for federal courts to play a limiting role,
checking the excesses of elected and politically appointed offi-
cials. Criminal defendants are precisely the sort of powerless
and despised subgroup who will not be adequately protected
through democratic political processes. 323 Moreover, there is a
well-established tradition of overly severe criminal penalties
being hurriedly enacted in response to a few high profile cases,
generating a "moral panic" of media and political frenzy
324 in
which politicians dread (even more than they usually do) ap-
pearing to be "soft" on crime and unsympathetic to actual and
potential victims. 325 Often, the only practical barrier to such
dramatic penalty increases is their budgetary impact. But
when already-severe penalties are made still more severe, the
323. Many scholars have made this point over the years, often citing the
Court's famous statement in footnote four of Carolene Products and the "rep-
resentation reinforcing" theories of judicial review found in the works of Pro-
fessors John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper. See United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("[Plrejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry."); ELY, supra note 148; JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). The problems of popular democratic
passions directed at persons accused of crime were noted by the framers of the
Bill of Rights, see Heald, supra note 98, at 473 n.68, and by utilitarian phi-
losophers, see id. ("[L]egislators and men in general are naturally inclined
[toward undue severity because of] antipathy, or want of compassion for indi-
viduals who are represented as dangerous and vile." (quoting Jeremy Ben-
tham)). Modern writers who have discussed this problem include: ELY, supra
note 148, at 97, 172-73; Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four,
and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislators Give a Damn About
the Rights of the Accused? 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 passim (1993); Gershow-
itz, supra note 176, at 1297-1301; Karlan, supra note 144, at 890-91; Robert-
son, supra note 322, at 479-91; William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the
Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20 (1996); Van Cleave,
supra note 131, at 276-78; Gilchrist, supra note 99, at 1126; and Heald, supra
note 98, at 476-77. Despite these well-known dangers, the Court seems to be
more concerned to protect corporations and other deep-pocket defendants from
the "acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property" via punitive damages
awards. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2001).
324. See supra note 273 and accompanying text; see also Van Cleave, supra
note 131, at 277 (citing anticriminal passions that led to enactment of the
California three strikes law).
325. Cf. Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 5 (1998) (noting that California politicians were afraid
to question the wisdom of the proposed three strikes law).
PROPORTIONALITY
increased costs are paid by future generations; the political
benefits (and risks) are immediate.326
The rights to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, recently expanded by the Supreme Court to include
many sentence-enhancement factors,3 27 do not adequately pro-
tect defendants from the imposition of unreasonably severe
penalties. These new rights do not apply to facts invoking a
mandatory minimum penalty, 328 or to the most common sen-
tence-enhancement factor-the defendant's prior conviction re-
cord. 329 Nor do these rights apply when defendants are sen-
tenced to the statutory maximum, no matter how severe, under
traditional indeterminate sentencing systems or voluntary sen-
tencing guidelines-the systems employed by the majority of
states.330 Even where these new rights apply, they grant lim-
ited protection. Juries determine historical facts, not the wis-
dom or fairness of the often draconian sentences which may be
authorized or mandated if certain facts are proven.3 31 For pre-
sent purposes, perhaps the most significant contribution of the
Court's recent sentencing due process cases is their underlying
premise-that the Constitution protects not only the innocent
but also the guilty, limiting the degree of punishment as well as
findings of guilt, and deliberately preferring to err on the side
of leniency. But, for the reasons summarized above, these fun-
damental human rights principles will have little impact if they
are implemented only with procedural guarantees; they must
be supplemented with meaningful substantive limitations on
severe penalties.
326. Van Cleave, supra note 131, at 276-77. Between 1986 and 2001 state
per-resident prison expenditures adjusted for inflation more than doubled.
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: SPECIAL REPORT; STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 2001, at 2 tbl.1
(2004). But the average annual percentage change-6.4%, id.-might have
seemed tolerable, especially from the short-term perspective of officials seek-
ing to win the next election.
327. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing Blakely, Ring,
and Apprendi); see also infra addendum.
328. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002).
329. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
330. Kevin R. Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing
Practices, in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, supra note
238, at 222, 224-33.
331. Indeed, jurors are usually not even told the current and future sen-
tencing consequences of the facts they are asked to determine, nor may the
jury be told of the its power to "nullify" unjust laws. United States v. Dough-
erty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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State courts interpreting their own constitutional counter-
parts of the Eighth Amendment have an especially important
limiting role to play. Decisions of these courts raise no issues of
federalism; state courts also confront fewer problems of democ-
ratic legitimacy because their members are elected or are oth-
erwise more directly politically accountable than are federal
judges. In addition, some state constitutions are worded in a
way that more readily supports proportionality analysis. 33
2 Of
course, a state judge may be reluctant to check the other two
branches precisely because he or she is directly politically ac-
countable. Yet there are numerous examples of state court de-
cisions, as well as lower federal court decisions, finding prison
sentences unconstitutionally excessive. 333 With a clearer un-
derstanding of proportionality principles, more judges may find
the will and the legal tools to combat excessive prison sen-
tences.
Finally, even if federal and state constitutional proportion-
ality review under the principles suggested here has a limited
near-term impact on the incidence of extremely severe sen-
332. For example, the Illinois Constitution specifies that "penalties shall be
determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objec-
tive of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." ILL. CONST. art I, § 11; see
supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (discussing cases interpreting this
provision); see also W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5 (forbidding cruel and unusual
punishment, but also specifying that "[plenalties shall be proportioned to the
character and degree of the offense"). Some state constitutions prohibit cruel
or unusual punishment, which courts have interpreted as an easier standard
to meet than cruel and unusual. See supra note 44 (Michigan). For other ex-
amples of this formulation, see ALA. CONST. art. I, § 15; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; LA. CONST. art. I, § 20. Cf. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (forbidding "cruel pun-
ishments").
333. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 830 So.2d 765, 781-82 (Ala. 2001); State v.
Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 72 (Ariz. 2003); People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 719 (Cal.
1983) (citing In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972)); People v. Gaskins, 923
P.2d 292 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003); Peo-
ple v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 2002); State v. Hayes, 739 So. 2d 301, 303-04
(La. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992); and State
v. Deal, 358 S.E.2d 226, 231 (W. Va. 1987). Miller and several other Illinois
sentencing proportionality cases are discussed supra notes 155-58 and accom-
panying text. Lower federal court cases overturning prison sentences on
Eighth Amendment grounds include: Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 712
(8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gracia, 755 F.2d 984, 990 (2d Cir. 1985); and
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 143 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Ramirez v. Castro,
365 F.3d 755, 767, 769-70 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding, in a post-Ewing case, that
a California three strikes sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, and that
state court rulings to the contrary were sufficiently unreasonable to justify re-
lief on federal habeas corpus; on the latter point, compare the discussion of
Andrade, supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text).
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tences, the articulation and clarification of these principles will
serve a useful purpose if it discourages further escalation in
sanction severity, and encourages judges, attorneys, and legis-
lators to take proportionality values seriously.
ADDENDUM
As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Booker, holding that the jury trial rights rec-
ognized in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington
also apply to the federal sentencing guidelines. 334 In a separate
opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court held that the
guidelines should be deemed advisory rather than legally bind-
ing, pending further legislation clarifying whether and how
Congress wishes to enact binding guidelines that comply with
the Court's constitutional requirements. Justice Breyer's opin-
ion also provides that trial courts should continue to consider
the sentencing purposes and other factors listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). Moreover, sentence appeals are still permitted, and
the standard of review is one of "reasonableness."335 It is very
unclear exactly what this review standard means, or how lower
courts are to reconcile the competing criteria in § 3553(a).
As courts struggle to make sense of these opinions, they
may find guidance in the three proportionality principles dis-
cussed in this Article. Although the Article focuses on constitu-
tional limitations on excessively severe sentences, the three
proportionality principles can be adapted to address and clarify
the statutory and policy issues identified in § 3553(a), as well
as the Court's review standard. For these purposes, reversible
disproportionality does not have to be "gross," but some defer-
ence to trial courts is appropriate. A sentence should be found
unreasonable if: (1) it is clearly disproportionate to the of-
fender's just deserts; or (2) its burdens on the offender clearly
outweigh the likely crime-control benefits (ends proportional-
ity); or (3) its burdens are clearly unnecessary in light of effec-
tive alternative measures (means proportionality); or (4) the
sentence is clearly inadequate to achieve one of the purposes
listed in § 3553(a) (means proportionality as a lower limit on
sanction severity, within limits of the offender's desert).
334. No. 04-104, 2005 WL 50108 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005). The Court's decision
consolidated United States v. Fanfan with United States v. Booker. See id. For
a discussion of Blakely and Apprendi, see supra notes 299, 327, and accompa-
nying text.
335. Id. at *25-27 (opinion of Breyer, J.).
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